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THE INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE
DOCTRINE, FEDERAL ELECTIONS, AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Michael T. Morley*
The U.S. Constitution does not confer authority to regulate
federal elections on states as entities. Rather, it grants that
authority specifically to the “Legislature” of each state. The
“independent state legislature doctrine” teaches that a state
constitution is legally incapable of imposing substantive
restrictions on the authority over federal elections that the U.S.
Constitution confers directly upon a state’s legislature. Over the
past 130 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly adopted
conflicting positions on this doctrine without recognizing its
deep historical roots or normative justifications.
The independent state legislature doctrine reflects the
prevailing understanding of states, Congress, and other actors
in the nineteenth century. Throughout that period, the doctrine
was consistently applied across a broad range of circumstances.
It protects important structural considerations and is
consistent with the political theory underlying the U.S.
Constitution’s election-related provisions. The U.S. Supreme
Court could reincorporate the doctrine into modern American
law with minimal disruption to either its precedents or state
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election systems. Moreover, the doctrine may present a
potentially substantial obstacle to the use of state constitutions
to combat partisan gerrymandering in congressional elections.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol55/iss1/2

2

Morley: The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, an

2020] INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................ 5
II. THE INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE ........... 15
A. THE DOCTRINE AND ITS LIMITS ................................... 15
B. THE DOCTRINE’S NUANCES ......................................... 21
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE AND
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS CLAUSE .............................. 27
1. The Elections Clause .......................................... 28
2. The Presidential Electors Clause ....................... 30
D. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS ...................................... 32
III. STATE PRECEDENTS ........................................................... 37
A. THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF 1820 AND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS.................... 38
B. NEW HAMPSHIRE AND ABSENTEE MILITARY VOTING ... 41
C. RHODE ISLAND AND PLURALITY ELECTIONS ................ 42
D. MISSISSIPPI AND THE TIMING OF CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS ................................................................. 44
IV. CONGRESSIONAL PRECEDENTS ........................................... 45
A. THE PLACE AND MANNER OF ELECTIONS..................... 48
B. THE TIMING OF ELECTIONS ......................................... 55
1. West Virginia (1872) ........................................... 55
2. Iowa (1878) ......................................................... 60
C. SELECTING U.S. SENATORS ......................................... 61
D. REFORMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE ...................... 65
E. LIMITS OF THE DOCTRINE: DISPUTES OVER VOTER
QUALIFICATIONS ........................................................ 66
V. THE DOCTRINE IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ..................... 69
A. DEVELOPING A PROCEDURE/SUBSTANCE DICHOTOMY:
THE EARLY YEARS ...................................................... 70

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

3

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 [2020], Art. 2

4

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1

B. FROM DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS TO
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: THE MODERN CASES

.................................................................................. 78
C. IMPLEMENTING THE DOCTRINE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY .................................................................... 90
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 93

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol55/iss1/2

4

Morley: The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, an

2020] INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE

5

I. INTRODUCTION
After decades of acknowledging the possibility that the U.S.
Constitution may prohibit partisan gerrymandering,1 the U.S.
Supreme Court closed the door on such claims in Rucho v. Common
Cause.2 The Rucho Court held that partisan gerrymandering claims
are nonjusticiable political questions under the U.S. Constitution.3
In the wake of Rucho, many commentators have advocated turning
to state constitutions to prevent states from engaging in partisan
gerrymandering.4
1 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I would not
foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to
correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases.”); see also Gill
v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018) (vacating the district court’s judgment in a partisan
gerrymandering case for lack of standing, while noting that the “contours and justiciability”
of partisan gerrymandering claims “are unresolved”); cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
124 (1986) (“[W]e decline to hold that [partisan gerrymandering] claims are never
justiciable.”), abrogated by Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). Partisan
gerrymandering is the adoption of congressional or legislative districts that have been
intentionally drawn to achieve political goals, usually by increasing the number of a
particular political party’s candidates who are likely to be elected. See Daniel D. Polsby &
Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against
Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 301–02 (1991) (“Gerrymandering,
broadly speaking, is any manipulation of district lines for partisan purposes.”). Some
definitions require that the districts be irregularly or unusually shaped in order to qualify as
a political gerrymander. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J.,
concurring) (“[G]errymandering—the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district
boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political purposes.”).
2 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
3 Id. at 2506–07 (“[P]artisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the
reach of the federal courts.”).
4 See, e.g., Samuel S.-H. Wang, Richard F. Ober Jr. & Ben Williams, Laboratories of
Democracy Reform: State Constitutions and Partisan Gerrymandering, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
203, 213 (2019) (“[R]eformers should instead follow the examples of Pennsylvania and North
Carolina and turn to state courts and state constitutions to achieve their goals.”); Charlie
Stewart, State Court Litigation: The New Front in the War Against Partisan Gerrymandering,
116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 152, 158 (2018) (arguing that state court litigation under state
constitutions is “an effective new strategy in the war against partisan gerrymandering due
to the potentially positive results, the speed with which it takes place, broad applicability,
and its insulation from Supreme Court review” (footnote omitted)); see also James A. Gardner,
Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State Constitutional Attempts to
Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 887 (2006) (“In seeking solutions to the
problems of gerrymandering, an examination of state constitutions has much to recommend
it.”); Bernard Grofman & Jonathan R. Cervas, Can State Courts Cure Partisan
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As Justice Brennan and others have explained, state
constitutions often provide greater protection for individual rights
than the U.S. Constitution.5 Many commentators view state
constitutions as fertile sources of new voting-related rights because
they typically contain election-related provisions that lack
analogues in the U.S. Constitution.6 For example, most state
constitutions include clauses affirmatively establishing a right to

Gerrymandering: Lessons from League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
(2018), 17 ELECTION L.J. 264, 270 (2018) (predicting that “more challenges to partisan
gerrymanders” will be “brought in state court” under state constitutional provisions); cf. G.
Michael Parsons, Partisan Gerrymandering Under Federal and State Law, in AMERICA
VOTES! CHALLENGES TO MODERN ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 277, 283 (Benjamin E.
Griffith & John Hardin Young eds., 4th ed. 2020) (arguing that federal district court
precedents concerning partisan gerrymandering “provide a rich and valuable resource for
voters to leverage as they seek to vindicate their rights under state constitutional law”).
5 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (“State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their
protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
federal law.”); see also JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 178 (2018) (arguing that state constitutional law
claims should not be “second thought[s]” or “argument[s] of last . . . resort”).
6 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89,
101–05 (2014) (outlining various voting protections and provisions found in state
constitutions that are absent from the U.S. Constitution); Gardner, supra note 4, at 969 n.319
(noting that “many state constitutions have provisions requiring elections to be ‘free,’” which
are “potentially promising sources of political rights” (citations omitted)); Wang, supra note
4, at 236 (discussing various provisions in state constitutions that “may be used to regulate
extreme partisan gerrymanders”).
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vote7 or requiring that elections be “free and equal.”8 Many state
constitutions also impose some general restrictions on congressional
redistricting by requiring districts to be contiguous and compact,
and political subdivisions to each be included within a single
district, where possible.9
Dicta in Rucho mentions state constitutions as potential tools for
combatting partisan gerrymandering,10 though the opinion does not
consider possible objections under the U.S. Constitution. A few state
constitutions specifically prohibit partisan gerrymandering in
congressional elections.11 The Florida Supreme Court invoked one
such provision to conclude that a partisan gerrymander violated the
Florida Constitution.12 Some state constitutions transfer authority
over congressional redistricting from the institutional legislature to
7 The U.S. Constitution contains many amendments prohibiting the federal and state
governments from denying people the right to vote on certain specified grounds, including
race, sex, inability to pay a poll tax, and age for those eighteen or older. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1; id. amend. XIX; id. amend. XXIV, § 1; id. amend. XXVI, § 1; see also Harper
v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (holding that poll taxes for state and local
elections violate the Equal Protection Clause). Three other provisions affirmatively guarantee
voting rights. Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment specify that anyone eligible to vote
for the larger house of a state legislature is also entitled to vote for the U.S. House of
Representatives and Senate, respectively. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII. And
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state will suffer reduction in its
representation in the U.S. House of Representatives and, by extension, the Electoral College,
if it deprives adult citizens of the right to vote for reasons other than felony convictions. Id.
amend. XIV, § 2; see also Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the Right to Vote
Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 282 (discussing
Section 2’s “express recognition of a right to vote” (footnote omitted)).
8 See Douglas, supra note 6, at 144–49 (listing election-related provisions in state
constitutions).
9 See Gardner, supra note 4, at 889–90 (concluding that such state constitutional provisions
“are not adequate to the task of restricting partisan gerrymandering because they do not
speak to gerrymandering undertaken for partisan gain”).
10 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507–08 (2019) (explaining how states “are
actively addressing the issue” of partisan gerrymandering “on a number of fronts,” including
through state constitutional provisions).
11 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20(a) (“No apportionment plan or individual district shall
be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent . . . .”). The
Eleventh Circuit upheld this provision’s validity against a challenge under the U.S.
Constitution. See Brown v. Sec’y of State, 668 F.3d 1271, 1285 (11th Cir. 2012).
12 League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 416 (Fla. 2015) (affirming
the trial court’s finding that the redistricting plan was motivated “by unconstitutional intent
to favor the Republican Party and incumbents”).
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independent redistricting commissions.13 In other states, such as
Pennsylvania14 and North Carolina,15 courts have re-interpreted
longstanding provisions of their state constitutions to prohibit
partisan gerrymandering.
This Article contends that, although state constitutions may
validly restrict states’ power to politically gerrymander state and
local legislative districts, they cannot limit a legislature’s power to
regulate most aspects of federal elections—including the
legislature’s authority to draw congressional district boundaries.
The U.S. Constitution confers power to regulate congressional
elections and select presidential electors specifically upon the
“Legislature” of each state, not the state as an entity. The Elections
Clause provides, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof,” although Congress may
“make or alter” such rules “at any time.”16 Similarly, the
Presidential Electors Clause states, “Each State shall appoint, in
such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors” to select the President.17
States lack inherent power to regulate federal elections, since the
U.S. Constitution creates all federal offices.18 Accordingly, the
13 E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2; HAW. CONST. art. IV,
§§ 2, 9; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2; WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 43; VA. CONST. art. II, §§ 6, 6-A; see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz.
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 824 (2015) (upholding the constitutionality of
Arizona’s independent redistricting commission).
14 See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 801–02 (Pa. 2018) (holding
that the state’s redistricting plan violated the state constitution’s “Free and Equal Elections
Clause”).
15 See Harper v. Lewis, No. 19 CVS 012667, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 122, at *8–9, 25 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2019) (enforcing the North Carolina Constitution’s Free Elections Clause
by enjoining the defendants from administering the 2020 congressional elections using
gerrymandered districts).
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
17 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 805 (1995) (noting that the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause are
both “express delegations of power to the States to act with respect to federal elections”).
18 See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001) (“[T]he States may regulate the incidents
of [congressional] elections, including balloting, only within the exclusive delegation of power
under the Elections Clause.”); Thornton, 514 U.S. at 805 (“[T]he power to regulate the
incidents of the federal system is not a reserved power of the States, but rather is delegated
by the Constitution.”).
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Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause are the only
sources of states’ authority to conduct and regulate nearly all
aspects of federal elections.19 Because these provisions confer power
over federal elections specifically upon state legislatures, state
constitutions cannot restrict the scope of that authority.
This reading of the Constitution, known as the “Independent
State Legislature Doctrine” (the doctrine),20 has a long and largely
overlooked history. The U.S. Supreme Court, several state supreme
courts, and both chambers of Congress employed this doctrine
during the nineteenth century.21 The 1890 edition of Thomas
Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations treatise reflects this
understanding, too.22 The treatise explained, “So far as the election
of representatives in Congress and electors of president and vicepresident is concerned, the State constitutions cannot preclude the
legislature from prescribing the ‘times, places, and manner of
holding’ the same, as allowed by the national Constitution.”23
Starting in the early twentieth century, however, state courts
largely rejected the doctrine,24 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
The Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause do not empower states to establish
candidate qualifications for federal offices and give states very little direct control over voter
qualifications for such offices, since those matters are governed by separate provisions of the
Constitution. See infra Section II.A.
20 Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 764–75 (2001) (discussing the doctrine’s role in facilitating absentee
voting in federal elections during the Civil War).
21 See infra Parts III–V.
22 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 754 n.1 (6th ed. 1890)
(discussing the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause).
23 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1). The doctrine was likewise discussed in the
“influential election law treatise,” Developments in the Law—Voting and Democracy, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1160 (2006), by George Washington McCrary, who had served as chair
of the U.S. House Committee on Elections and as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. See GEORGE WASHINGTON MCCRARY, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF
ELECTIONS §§ 109–12, at 81–84 (1875) (discussing authorities supporting the independent
state legislature doctrine).
24 See, e.g., Brown v. Saunders, 166 S.E. 105, 107 (Va. 1932) (invalidating congressional
districts adopted by the state legislature because they violated the state constitution’s
requirements concerning equality of population); Moran v. Bowley, 179 N.E. 526, 531–32 (Ill.
1932) (same); In re Opinion of the Justices, 107 A. 705, 706 (Me. 1919) (holding that the state
constitution limits the state legislature’s authority under the Presidential Electors Clause);
see also Chase v. Lujan, 149 P.2d 1003, 1010–11 (N.M. 1944) (holding that the state
19
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attitude toward it began to vacillate25—all without recognizing or
grappling with the doctrine’s history throughout the previous
century. Some opinions issued in the course of resolving the dispute
over the 2000 presidential election suggested that the Court might
have been revitalizing the doctrine.26 And lower federal courts in
recent years have interpreted the Elections Clause and the
Presidential Electors Clause as prohibiting state executive officials,
as a matter of federal constitutional law, from regulating federal
elections without authorization from the state legislature.27 But the
constitution prevented the legislature from allowing absentee voting, including for federal
offices); State ex rel. Carroll v. Becker, 45 S.W.2d 533, 536–37 (Mo. 1932) (holding that the
legislature must act pursuant to the lawmaking process set forth in the state constitution,
including the Governor’s veto, when enacting statutes under the Elections Clause); State ex
rel. Schrader v. Polley, 127 N.W. 848, 851 (S.D. 1910) (holding that a state law establishing
congressional districts could be suspended by a public referendum); cf. In re Opinion to the
Governor, 103 A. 513, 516 (R.I. 1918) (noting changing judicial views of the doctrine).
A few courts, however, continued to apply the doctrine. See, e.g., State ex rel. Beeson v.
Marsh, 34 N.W.2d 279, 285–87 (Neb. 1948) (holding that the court need not consider whether
state statutes establishing ballot-access requirements for presidential candidates violated the
state constitution, because the state constitution does not apply to laws concerning the
appointment of presidential electors); Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O’Connell, 181
S.W.2d 691, 694–96 (Ky. 1944) (holding that the state constitution likely could not restrict
the state legislature’s power to allow absentee military voting in presidential elections);
Parsons v. Ryan, 60 P.2d 910, 912 (Kan. 1936) (“We are not persuaded by the argument that
the enactment of election laws, being an exercise of police power, is subject to [state]
constitutional restrictions which prevent the Legislature from limiting the right of candidates
to have their names on the general ballot. As has been shown, the Federal Constitution
commands the state Legislature to direct the manner of choosing electors.”).
25 See infra Sections V.A–V.B.
26 See Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 77 (2000) (per curiam)
(questioning “the extent to which the Florida Constitution could, consistent with [the
Presidential Electors Clause], ‘circumscribe the legislative power’” over presidential elections
(citation omitted)); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) (noting that a
legislature’s power over the appointment of presidential electors “can neither be taken away
nor abdicated” (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 9 (1874))); id. at 112–13 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring) (explaining that, because state legislatures enact laws governing presidential
elections under the Presidential Electors Clause, “the text of the election law itself, and not
just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on independent significance”).
27 See Libertarian Party v. Dardenne, No. 08-582-JJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137402,
at *7–9 (M.D. La. Sept. 25, 2008) (holding that, where Hurricane Norman forced the
Secretary of State’s office to be closed on the statutory deadline for political parties to file
their presidential candidates’ ballot-access petitions, the Secretary violated the Presidential
Electors Clause by unilaterally establishing a new deadline and excluding parties that did
not meet it), vacated as moot, 308 F. App’x 861 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Libertarian Party
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Court’s 5–4 opinion in the 2015 case Arizona State Legislature v.
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission brusquely rejected
the doctrine.28
The independent state legislature doctrine has likewise received
scant academic attention. Attorney Hayward Smith published an
article following the 2000 election largely disputing the doctrine’s
historical underpinnings.29 His analysis led several commentators
to reject the doctrine.30 Professor Vikram David Amar, based on his
own survey of the relevant history, agreed that federal
constitutional provisions conferring power on state legislatures
of Ohio v. Brunner, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1011–13 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (holding that a directive
concerning ballot-access requirements for minor parties issued by the Ohio’s Secretary of
State after a federal court invalidated the state’s statutory requirements violated the
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, because the legislature had not delegated
its authority to promulgate such rules); cf. Moore v. Hosemann, No. 3:08cv573 TSL-JCS, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141865, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 29, 2008) (holding that, although “federal
courts will review state actions that are a significant departure from, or go beyond a fair
reading of, state election laws[,] . . . the [Mississippi] Secretary of State’s interpretation of
state election law and his determination to close his office at the traditional time of 5:00 p.m.
is reasonable and cannot be said to be inconsistent with the state’s election statutes”);
Baldwin v. Cortes, No. 1:08-cv-01626, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72035, at *7–12 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
12, 2008) (rejecting Presidential Electors Clause challenge because the Pennsylvania
Secretary of State had statutory authority to execute a consent decree changing the deadline
for candidates to file ballot-access petitions), aff’d, 378 F. App’x 135, 138–39 (3d Cir. 2010)
(rejecting plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to “the Secretary’s 1984 entry into the consent
decrees” due to “the Pennsylvania legislature’s explicit delegation of authority to the
Secretary of the Commonwealth to administer the state election scheme”). But see Largess v.
Supreme Judicial Court, 373 F.3d 219, 227 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting the disagreement among
the Justices in Bush v. Gore over whether the Presidential Electors Clause limits “the internal
allocations of power in a state government”).
28 576 U.S. 787, 816–19 (2015).
29 See generally Smith, supra note 20; see also Derek T. Muller, Legislative Delegations and
the Elections Clause, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 726–28 (2016) (discussing congressional
election contests in which the doctrine was invoked); Saul Zipkin, Note, Judicial Redistricting
and the Article I State Legislature, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 350, 355–67 (2003) (reviewing
episodes in the doctrine’s history).
30 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Judging “New Law” in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 691, 727–28 (2001) (“[A]s a matter of historical practice, state legislatures were not
understood at the time to be more ‘independent’ by virtue of Article II of the constraints and
conditions on their power than they were when acting pursuant to any other source of
authority.”); see also Marcia L. McCormick, When Worlds Collide: Federal Construction of
State Institutional Competence, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1167, 1194 n.135 (2007) (“[T]here is no
historical support for the significance of the language in Article II.” (citing Smith, supra
note 20, at 783–84)).
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were “not designed to interfere with the preexisting control that
people enjoyed over their state legislatures” through their state
constitutions.31 After conducting their own analysis of the doctrine
and its history, Professor Nathaniel Persily and his co-authors
concluded that the doctrine’s “consequences would be both bizarre
and disastrous.”32 Others have similarly expressed skepticism33 or
outright rejected the doctrine.34

Vikram David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the People of the States Instruct
and Coerce Their State Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional Amendment Process?, 41
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037, 1041, 1074 (2000) [hereinafter, Amar, The People Made Me Do It]
(contending that Article V allows a state’s citizens to prevent agency problems by restricting
or directing the institutional legislature’s actions concerning federal constitutional
amendments); see also Vikram David Amar, Direct Democracy and Article II: Additional
Thoughts on Initiatives and Presidential Elections, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 641 (2008)
(presenting a condensed version of the argument that a state’s citizens may use the initiative
process to change a winner-take-all system for allocating presidential electors among
presidential candidates to a district-based system).
32 Nathaniel Persily, Samuel Byker, William Evans & Alon Sachar, When Is a Legislature
Not a Legislature? When Voters Regulate Elections by Initiative, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 690
(2016).
33 See David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737,
748 (2001) (“Determining the ways in which a state constitution may and may not limit the
legislature’s decisions about presidential electors will . . . be a difficult and complex task.”);
cf. Richard L. Hasen, When “Legislature” May Mean More Than “Legislature”: Initiated
Electoral College Reform and the Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 626
(2008) (noting that “there are reasonable policy arguments to be made on both sides of th[e]
question” of whether the term “Legislature” in the Presidential Electors Clause includes the
initiative process).
34 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court in Politics, in THE UNFINISHED ELECTION
OF 2000, at 105, 122 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001) (commenting on the dearth of historical
evidence that the Framers intended to adopt the independent state legislature doctrine);
Robert A. Schapiro, Conceptions and Misconceptions of State Constitutional Law in Bush v.
Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 661, 672 (2001) (arguing that the independent state legislature
doctrine “does not rest on firm foundations of text, precedent, or history”); Zipkin, supra
note 29, at 354 (arguing, based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, that state constitutions
limit state legislatures’ exercise of the power they receive from the U.S. Constitution when
they are not acting as agents of the federal government). As discussed later, see infra notes
422–423, 533–534 and accompanying text, the Court and some commentators have gone so
far as to conclude that a state constitution may redefine what constitutes a state
“Legislature,” so that laws or state constitutional amendments regulating federal elections
may be enacted through public initiatives without the institutional legislature’s involvement.
See, e.g., David S. Wagner, Note, The Forgotten Avenue of Reform: The Role of States in
Electoral College Reform and the Use of Ballot Initiatives to Effect that Change, 25 REV. LITIG.
31
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This Article makes three contributions to the literature. First, it
presents a competing, comprehensive historical analysis of the
independent state legislature doctrine as applied throughout the
nineteenth century, including several examples of the doctrine that
have never before been identified in the literature or caselaw.
Second, building on my previous work,35 this Article offers an indepth defense of the doctrine.36 It demonstrates that the

575, 599 (2006) (“[T]he better answer is to regard ballot initiatives as a constitutional exercise
of a state’s legislative power under Article II, Section 1.”).
35 See Michael T. Morley, The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” and the Elections
Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 868 (2015) [hereinafter Morley, Intratextual Independent
“Legislature”] (“The legislature, as referenced in [the Elections Clause and Presidential
Electors Clause], is the state’s general lawmaking body, and its power under the federal
Constitution to regulate federal elections may not be reduced or withdrawn by state
constitutions.”); Michael T. Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State Constitutions,
67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 189, 204 (2014) [hereinafter Morley, State Constitutions]
(concluding that “state constitutional provisions may not be used as the basis for invalidating
state laws as they apply to federal elections”).
36 James C. Kirby, former Chief Counsel to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, published a brief defense of the independent
state legislature doctrine over a half-century ago. See James C. Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the
Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 501
(1962) (concluding that “it appears . . . the legislature is free of state constitutional
limitations” when regulating presidential elections). Several commentators have adopted
Kirby’s analysis. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 811, 834 (2001) (“The state constitution may make the ordinary procedures
for the enactment of legislation applicable to the legislature’s determination of the manner
in which members of Congress are chosen or electors are appointed, but it may not restrict
the manner of appointment that the legislature selects.”); Voting Rights—Residence
Requirements for Voting in Presidential Elections, 18 VAND. L. REV. 337, 342 (1964) (“It seems
safe to conclude that the choosing of presidential electors is within the power of the state
legislatures, in whatever manner they deem proper, and that this power is not limited by
state constitutional provisions . . . .”); Recent Statute, 77 HARV. L. REV. 574, 578 (1964) (“[I]t
seems safe to conclude that article II, section 1, grants to state legislatures plenary power to
set suffrage qualifications.”). Other pieces have affirmed the doctrine in passing while
focusing on other topics. See Walter Clark, The Electoral College and Presidential Suffrage,
65 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 740 (1917) (“[T]he power and discretion . . . to provide the manner in
which the presidential electors shall be chosen is derived solely from the Constitution of the
United States, and no state constitution can restrict the execution of such power.”); Emory
Widener, Jr., Note, The Virginia Absent Voters System, 8 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 36, 37 (1951)
(stating that the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause “serve[] to protect absent
voters statutes from restrictive regulations in state constitutions” (citing Commonwealth v.
O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. 1944))); Joseph R. Wyatt II, The Lessons of the Hayes-Tilden
Election Controversy: Some Suggestions for Electoral College Reform, 8 RUTGERS-CAMDEN
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independent state legislature doctrine is consistent not only with
historical practice, but the structure and political theory underlying
the Constitution, as well.37 Finally, this piece identifies various
ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court may resuscitate the doctrine
while preserving many precedents that appear to be in tension with
it.
Part II of this Article begins by introducing the independent state
legislature doctrine in greater depth. It then explores the
development of the constitutional provisions that give rise to the
doctrine: the Elections Clause and the Presidential Electors Clause.
After tracing the evolution of these provisions during the
Constitutional Convention, this Part examines the normative
justifications for their delegations of authority specifically to state
legislatures.
The following two Parts discuss how the doctrine was applied
throughout the nineteenth century. Part III analyzes the doctrine’s
impact at the state level. Justice Joseph Story and Daniel Webster
invoked the doctrine at the Massachusetts Constitutional
Convention of 1820, convincing delegates that including restrictions
on congressional redistricting in the Massachusetts Constitution
would violate the U.S. Constitution.38 State supreme courts also
applied the doctrine when enforcing state laws governing
congressional elections that violated state constitutional
provisions.39 Part IV turns to Congress, exploring how both the U.S.
House and Senate embraced the doctrine when resolving election
contests and crafting legislation.
Part V contrasts this nineteenth century history with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s vacillating attitude toward the independent state
L.J. 617, 624 n.30 (1977) (“[A] state constitution may not circumscribe the legislature’s range
of choice.”). One student note purportedly embraces the doctrine, but then suggests that state
constitutions may impose various restrictions on federal elections. See Note, Limitations on
Access to the General Election Ballot, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 86, 87, 89–90 (1937) (stating that
“not even the provisions of the state constitutions can limit the state legislatures,” but then
concluding that state constitutional provisions creating voting rights prevent state
legislatures from enacting unreasonable election regulations).
37 This piece complements Professor Muller’s work, which concluded that “the historical
understanding of the power of the ‘Legislature’ precluded a delegation of its power to another
entity.” Muller, supra note 29, at 718.
38 See infra Section III.A.
39 See infra Sections III.B–III.D.
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legislature doctrine. The Court endorsed the doctrine in 1892 in
McPherson v. Blacker,40 as well as in decisions regarding the
disputed 2000 presidential election.41 A contrasting line of
precedents, culminating in the Court’s 2015 ruling in Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission, rejects the doctrine.42 This
Part analyzes how the modern Court could implement the doctrine,
even without overruling most of its contrary precedents. Part VI
briefly concludes.

II. THE INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE
A. THE DOCTRINE AND ITS LIMITS

States lack inherent power to regulate federal elections.43 The
only authority they have over such elections comes from the U.S.
Constitution, which created federal offices and specifies how they
are to be filled.44 But the Constitution does not grant authority over
federal elections to states as entities. Rather, the Elections Clause
and Presidential Electors Clause confer the power to regulate the
“[m]anner” in which Representatives, Senators, and presidential
electors are chosen specifically upon the “Legislature” of each
state.45

40 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (“[F]rom the formation of the government until now the practical
construction of the [Presidential Electoral Clause] has conceded plenary power to the state
legislatures in the matter of the appointment of electors.”).
41 See supra note 26.
42 576 U.S. 787, 813–23 (2015).
43 See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
44 See id.
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. The Elections Clause expressly allows
Congress to “make or alter” rules concerning congressional elections “at any time . . . except
as to the Places of [choosing] Senators.” Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Presidential Electors Clause
lacks such language. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (“Congress is
empowered to determine the time of choosing the electors and the day on which they are to
give their votes . . . but otherwise the power and jurisdiction of the State is exclusive . . . .”).
The Court has held, however, that Congress’s authority over presidential and congressional
elections is coextensive. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam) (explaining
that Congress has “very broad authority to prevent corruption in national Presidential
elections”); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 n.7 (1970) (plurality opinion) (“[T]his
Court . . . [has] upheld the power of Congress to regulate certain aspects of elections for
presidential and vice-presidential electors, specifically rejecting a construction of Art. II, § 1,

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

15

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 [2020], Art. 2

16

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that these provisions delegate
sweepingly broad authority. The “comprehensive words” of the
Elections Clause, for example:
embrace authority to provide a complete code for
congressional elections, not only as to times and places,
but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of
voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and
corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors
and canvassers, and making and publication of election
returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements
as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows
are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right
involved.46
Likewise, the Presidential Electors Clause grants state legislatures
“plenary” power over the selection of presidential electors.47
Together, these provisions give state legislatures far-reaching
authority to regulate federal elections. The independent state
legislature doctrine provides that a state constitution cannot legally
limit that authority or prohibit the state legislature from exercising
it in certain ways. Commentators such as Professor Nate Persily
object that recognizing the doctrine today would be tremendously
destabilizing, freeing legislatures from a wide range of state
constitutional constraints.48 Even under the independent state
legislature doctrine, however, legislatures’ authority to regulate
federal elections would remain subject to numerous important
constraints.
First, the Court has held that the Elections Clause contains
implicit limitations on the power it conveys. It does not empower
states to adopt laws that “dictate electoral outcomes, . . . favor or
that would have curtailed the power of Congress, to regulate such elections.” (citation
omitted)); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) (holding that Congress has
power to “safeguard” the election of presidential electors “from the improper use of money to
influence the result”).
46 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
47 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
48 Persily et al., supra note 32, at 708 (stating that the doctrine would roll back “all state
laws or constitutional provisions regulating federal elections that were passed by initiative
or by a state constitutional convention”).
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disfavor a class of candidates, or . . . evade important constitutional
restraints.”49 The Court applied this principle in Cook v. Gralike,
holding that states may not “disadvantage” certain congressional
candidates by specifying on the ballot whether they complied, or
promised to comply, with voter instructions regarding congressional
term limits.50
Second, other constitutional provisions impose express
restrictions on the scope of the Elections Clause and Presidential
Electors Clause. The legislature’s power to regulate the “manner” of
federal elections does not enable it to establish qualifications for
candidates in either congressional or presidential elections, or for
voters in congressional elections, since those matters are expressly
governed by other constitutional provisions. Article I specifies the
age, citizenship, and residency requirements for Representatives
and Senators.51 Similarly, Article II provides that a person must be
a “natural born citizen,” at least thirty-five years old, and a resident
of the United States for at least fourteen years to be eligible to serve
as President.52 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that neither

49 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833–34 (1995); see also Cook v. Gralike,
531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001) (reaffirming the existence of implicit limitations on the Elections
Clause’s grant of authority to state legislatures); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788
n.9 (1983) (noting that states may enact “generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions
that protect the integrity and reliability of the [federal] electoral process itself”).
50 Cook, 531 U.S. at 525; see also id. at 526 (concluding that the Elections Clause did not
permit the state’s use of ballot notations to “attempt to ‘dictate electoral outcomes’” (quoting
Thornton, 514 U.S. at 833–34)).
51 A member of the House of Representatives must be at least twenty-five years old, have
been a U.S. citizen for at least seven years, and “be an Inhabitant of that State in which he
shall be chosen.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Similar requirements apply to Senators, except
they must be at least thirty years old and have been a U.S. citizen for at least nine years. Id.
art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
52 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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Congress53 nor states54 may impose additional qualifications for
federal candidates.
Likewise, the Voter Qualifications Clause and Seventeenth
Amendment specify that, to be qualified to vote for Representatives
and Senators, a person “shall have the Qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”55
These provisions guarantee that anyone entitled to vote for the
larger chamber of the state legislature may also vote for Congress.56
Neither the Elections Clause nor any other provision of the U.S.
Constitution authorizes state legislatures to directly alter these
requirements.57 An initial draft of the U.S. Constitution would have
granted state legislatures the authority to establish voter
qualifications for House elections, but the Framers rejected that
proposal.58
Each state as an entity (i.e., not just the legislature) has inherent
sovereign power to determine who is qualified to vote for state
legislators and other state officials,59 subject to federal
53 See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 832 (“[T]he Framers were particularly concerned that a grant
to Congress of the authority to set its own qualifications would lead inevitably to
congressional self-aggrandizement and the upsetting of the delicate constitutional balance.”);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969) (holding that a chamber of Congress’s
authority as the sole judge of its members’ elections, qualifications, and returns does not allow
it to adopt additional qualifications for membership).
54 See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 836 (“[I]f the qualifications for Congress are fixed in the
Constitution, then a state-passed measure with the avowed purpose of imposing indirectly
such an additional qualification violates the Constitution.”).
55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; accord id. amend. XVII.
56 See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663 (1884) (holding that states “define who are to
vote for the popular branch of their own legislature, and the Constitution of the United States
says the same persons shall vote for members of Congress in that State”).
57 See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 17 (2013) (“Prescribing
voting qualifications, therefore, ‘forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national
government’ by the Elections Clause . . . .” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 371
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
58 See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 153 (Max Farrand ed. 1911)
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (reprinting a proposed constitutional provision stating,
“The Qualifications of the Electors shall be . . . prescribed by the Legislatures of the several
States; but their provisions . . . concerning them may at any Time be altered and superseded
by the Legislature of the United States”).
59 See Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570–71 (1900) (“It is obviously essential to the
independence of the States . . . that their power to prescribe . . . the manner of [state officials’]
election . . . should be exclusive, and free from external interference, except so far as plainly
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constitutional restraints.60 States typically list the voter eligibility
requirements for state offices in their constitutions.61 Any power
that a state legislature possesses over voter qualifications for state
offices stems from the state constitution—not the U.S.
Constitution—and is therefore subject to any constraints the state
constitution may impose. By virtue of the Voter Qualifications
Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment, state constitutional
provisions establishing voter qualifications for state legislatures
indirectly establish voter qualifications for Congress, too.
Recognizing this limit on the independent state legislature doctrine,
the chambers of Congress consistently enforced state constitutional
restrictions concerning voter qualifications throughout the
nineteenth century.62 In short, the U.S. Constitution does not
provided by the Constitution of the United States.”); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 463 (1991) (recognizing the states’ inherent authority, reflected in the Tenth
Amendment, over the selection of their officials).
60 See infra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“Every citizen of the United States who is at least
eighteen years of age and who is a permanent resident of the state, if registered as provided
by law, shall be an elector of the county where registered.”).
62 See DELANO VS. MORGAN, H.R. REP. NO. 40-42, at 1–2 (1868) (concluding that a state
may enforce a state constitutional provision establishing U.S. citizenship as a “qualification[]
for an elector”), resolution proposed by committee report adopted, CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2809–10 (1868); JAMES H. BURCH, H.R. REP. NO. 40-4, at 5 (1867) (concluding that
the U.S. Constitution did not prohibit a state constitutional provision that deemed “all
persons who could not take the prescribed [loyalty] oath” ineligible to vote), resolutions
proposed by committee report adopted, CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 403 (1868); Letcher
v. Moore, 23rd Cong. (1833), in 1 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING REFERENCES TO PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS, AND DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE § 54, at 41 (1907)
[hereinafter HINDS’ PRECEDENTS] (noting that “[t]he State constitution . . . allowed every male
over the age of 21 to vote in the county where he was actually residing, provided he had
resided in the State two years”); see also JOSHUA E. WILSON V. JOHN MCLAURIN, H.R. REP.
NO. 54-1566, at 2, 4 (1896) (relying on a state constitutional provision to determine who
qualified as eligible voters), resolutions proposed by committee report adopted without debate,
28 CONG. REC. 4673 (1896); THRASHER V. ENLOE, H.R. REP. NO. 53-842, at 5–6 (1894)
(enforcing both a state constitutional provision making payment of a poll tax a voter
qualification, as well as a state statute requiring voters to prove in a particular manner that
they paid the tax), resolutions proposed by committee report adopted without debate, 26 CONG.
REC. 7255 (1894); JOHN CESSNA V. BENJAMIN F. MEYERS, H.R. REP. NO. 42-11, at 1–2 (1872)
(discussing a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution concerning the qualifications of
voters, particularly residency inside the election district), resolution proposed by committee
report adopted, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1610–11 (1872).
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empower legislatures to impose either candidate qualifications for
any federal office or voter qualifications for congressional elections.
Third, laws enacted by state legislatures pursuant to either the
Elections Clause or Presidential Electors Clause are subject to the
restrictions of both the U.S. Constitution63 and federal statutes. For
example, the Fifteenth,64 Nineteenth,65 and Twenty-Sixth66
Amendments prohibit the federal and state governments from
discriminating based on race, sex, or age (for those over eighteen
years old) with regard to the right to vote. The Twenty-Fourth
Amendment prohibits poll taxes for federal elections.67 Legislatures
are also subject to due process and equal protection constraints
when regulating federal elections.68 Additionally, Congress itself
retains plenary authority to directly regulate federal elections or to
“alter”69 any rules that a legislature adopts.70 Thus, while the
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause permit state
legislatures to regulate federal elections without state

63 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (rejecting the notion that the Presidential
Electors Clause “gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such
burdens are expressly prohibited in other constitutional provisions”).
64 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
65 Id. amend. XIX.
66 Id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
67 Id. amend. XXIV, § 1; cf. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (holding
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits poll taxes for state and local elections).
68 It is debatable whether these constraints arise from the Fourteenth Amendment, which
typically governs states, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, or the parallel restrictions in the Fifth
Amendment, id. amend. V, which generally constrains powers granted by the U.S.
Constitution. Since the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause as providing the same protections as the Fourteenth Amendment, despite the
provisions’ linguistic differences, the analysis and outcome are substantively the same either
way. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“The Fifth Amendment . . . does not
contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to
the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive.”).
69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
70 Even though the Presidential Electors Clause lacks comparable language, the U.S.
Supreme Court has read it in pari materia with the Elections Clause, concluding that the
scope of Congress’s power over congressional and presidential elections is identical. See
Michael T. Morley, Dismantling the Unitary Electoral System? Uncooperative Federalism in
State and Local Elections, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 109 (2017) (noting that the Court
has not “recognize[d] any difference between Congress’s power over congressional elections
and its power over presidential elections”); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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constitutional constraints, state legislatures remain bound by a
wide range of explicit and implicit limitations stemming from both
the U.S. Constitution and Congress.
B. THE DOCTRINE’S NUANCES

The independent state legislature doctrine raises three
conceptually distinct questions about the relationship among the
U.S. Constitution, state constitutions, and federal elections—
though the doctrine does not require any particular resolution of
these issues.
First, is the meaning of the U.S. Constitution’s references to the
state “legislature” a matter of federal or state constitutional law?
The term might be defined under federal constitutional law, based
on its plain meaning, as referring exclusively to institutions
conventionally and historically understood as legislatures: multimember bodies comprised of elected members that possess general
lawmaking authority over a state and periodically convene and
recess.71 Under this approach, a state-level entity or process that
does not satisfy these minimum requirements would not qualify as
a “legislature” and therefore could not regulate federal elections.
This interpretation would preclude the people of a state from
adopting election-related rules or redistricting requirements
through public initiatives and referenda.72 It would likewise

71 See Morley, Intratextual Independent ”Legislature,” supra note 35, at 856 (“[E]very
[constitutional] clause that gives some insight into the nature of a legislature uses the term
to refer to a particular institution within each state that contains members, is presumptively
comprised of multiple branches, periodically convenes and meets for limited periods of time,
and then enters into recess.”).
72 See, e.g., Nicholas P. Stabile, Comment, An End Run around a Representative
Democracy? The Unconstitutionality of a Ballot Initiative to Alter the Method of Distributing
Electors, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1496–97 (2009) (“[T]he use of a ballot initiative is an
unconstitutional means by which to alter the method of selecting electors.” (footnote
omitted)); Michael McLaughlin, Note, Direct Democracy and the Electoral College: Can a
Popular Initiative Change How a State Appoints Its Electors?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2943, 2947
(2008) (“Article II should be read to exclude a state from directing the manner of appointment
by popular initiative.”).
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prohibit states from granting final authority over such matters to
entities such as independent redistricting commissions.73
Alternatively, one may read the Elections Clause and
Presidential Electors Clause as referring to any entity or
lawmaking process that a state constitution recognizes or
designates as the state “legislature.”74 The U.S. Supreme Court has
applied this interpretation throughout much of the twentieth
century, and most recently reaffirmed it in the 2015 case Arizona
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission.75 That case allows states to grant independent
commissions created through a public initiative process sole
responsibility for drawing congressional districts, completely
stripping the institutional state legislature of any authority over the
matter.76
The text of the U.S. Constitution, the history of the Elections
Clause and Presidential Electors Clause,77 and the logic of the
independent state legislature doctrine all strongly support the
plain-meaning interpretation of “Legislature.” Under that
interpretation, only a state’s institutional legislature may regulate
federal elections. The Elections Clause allows state legislatures to
regulate the “Times, Places and Manner” of federal elections, while
allowing Congress to “make or alter” such rules, “except as to the
Places of chusing Senators.”78 The Constitutional Convention
73 See Morley, Intratextual Independent “Legislature,” supra note 35, at 863 (“[T]he best
reading of the word legislature as it appears throughout the Constitution . . . is that it . . .
cannot extend to other entities such as independent redistricting commissions.”).
74 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916) (holding that a state’s
voters may use a public referendum to reject a congressional redistricting plan adopted by
the state legislature, because a state may “include the referendum in the scope of the
legislative power”); cf. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 368 (1932) (holding that the Elections
Clause does not “endow the legislature of the State with power to enact laws in any manner
other than that in which the constitution of the State has provided that laws shall be
enacted”).
75 576 U.S. 787 (2015).
76 Id. at 813 (holding that the Elections Clause does not “preclude the people of Arizona
from creating a commission operating independently of the state legislature to establish
congressional districts”). For an analysis of Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission’s
impact on Elections Clause jurisprudence, see generally Michael T. Morley, The New
Elections Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 79 (2016).
77 See infra Section II.C.
78 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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included that exception to ensure that state legislatures could
convene at “the seats of Govt [government] in the States” to choose
Senators.79 This proviso in the Elections Clause suggests that its
reference to the “Legislature” refers to the institutional state
legislature, which typically conducts its business in the state
capitol.
Perhaps more importantly, most other mentions of the term
“legislature” throughout the Constitution expressly refer to a state’s
institutional legislature.80 The Constitution contemplates that a
legislature is an entity comprised of multiple81 elected82 members83
that may periodically meet84 and recess.85 And Article I, § 3
unquestionably empowered each state’s institutional “legislature,”
as distinct from the people of the state, to choose its U.S. Senators.86

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 58, at 613; see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
§ 826, at 292 (1833) (“The choice is to be made
by the state legislature; and it would not be either necessary, or becoming in congress to
prescribe the place, where it should sit.”). During the Virginia ratifying convention, James
Madison explained, “[T]he reason of the exception was, that, if Congress could fix the place of
choosing the senators, it might compel the state legislatures to elect them in a different place
from that of their usual sessions, which would produce some inconvenience, and was not
necessary for the object of regulating the elections.” The Debates in the Convention of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 14, 1788)
(statement of Madison), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 366 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891)
[hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
80 Morley, Intratextual Independent ”Legislature,” supra note 35, at 855–56; see Ariz. State
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 829 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (referencing the Constitution’s “seventeen provisions referring to a State’s
‘Legislature’”).
81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (discussing “the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature” (emphasis added)); accord id. amend. XVII.
82 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (discussing “Electors” for state legislatures); accord id. amend. XVII.
83 Id. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[T]he members of the several State Legislatures . . . shall be bound by
Oath or Affirmation . . . .”).
84 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (specifying that a temporary appointment to the U.S. Senate shall last
“until the next Meeting of the Legislature”); id. art. IV, § 4 (allowing a state Executive to
request federal assistance against “domestic Violence” when “the Legislature cannot be
convened”).
85 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (discussing the state Executive’s power to fill U.S. Senate vacancies
that “happen . . . during the Recess of the Legislature”).
86 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (specifying that a state’s U.S. Senators shall be “chosen by the
Legislature thereof”); see also Morley, Intratextual Independent “Legislature,” supra note 35,
79
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This was also how every Founding Era state constitution that used
the term “legislature” employed it.87
Necessity might require us to interpret the term “legislature” in
the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause more broadly
if a state engaged in radical experimentation—for example, by
abolishing its institutional legislature and moving to a system of
pure direct democracy.88 Within the realm of realistic possibilities,
however, a plain-meaning interpretation of those clauses would not
allow a state that retains its traditional institutional legislature to
assign ultimate authority over the regulation of federal elections to
some other entity.89 Having said that, the independent state
legislature doctrine would technically be compatible with the
broader interpretation of the term “legislature,” too. Under this
alternate possible reading, the state constitution could designate a
particular entity or process as the “legislature” for the purpose of
regulating federal elections, but the state constitution would be
unable to impose substantive restrictions on the scope of its power
under the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause.
Second, may a state constitution regulate the process or
procedure that the “legislature”—however that term is defined—
must use to enact laws governing federal elections? For example,
may a state constitution allow the state’s governor to veto
legislation concerning federal elections? On one hand, because the
U.S. Constitution confers power to regulate federal elections
at 858–59 (discussing evidence from the Constitutional Convention that the Framers
empowered a state’s institutional legislature to appoint its U.S. Senators).
87 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 828 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[E]very state constitution from the Founding Era that used the
term legislature defined it as a distinct multimember entity comprised of representatives.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Michael T. Morley, The Intratextual Independent
“Legislature” and the Elections Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 131, 147 & n.101 (2015))).
88 See Amar, The People Made Me Do It, supra note 31, at 1065 (discussing this
hypothetical). Abolishing an institutional legislature would raise serious questions under the
Guarantee Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”); cf. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant,
241 U.S. 565, 569–70 (1916) (holding that a state constitutional provision allowing the state’s
electorate to reject a state law through a public referendum does not violate the Guarantee
Clause).
89 See Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. at 842 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The
majority’s contrary understanding requires it to accept a definition of ‘the Legislature’ that
contradicts the term’s plain meaning . . . .”).
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exclusively upon the state legislature, other organs of state
government, like the governor, arguably may not participate in that
process. Alternatively, the U.S. Constitution may allow state
legislatures to regulate federal elections without displacing the
ordinary lawmaking processes set forth in state constitutions.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long adopted this latter conception,
recognizing the authority of state governors to veto laws governing
federal elections to the same extent the state constitution allows
them to veto other enactments.90 The independent state legislature
doctrine appears largely agnostic on this issue. Indeed, a nineteenth
century precedent in which the U.S. House embraced the doctrine
concluded that an institutional legislature must adhere to the
ordinary lawmaking procedure set forth in the state constitution.91
Third, must courts apply a super-strong plain meaning approach
when construing state laws regulating federal elections, or may they
interpret such measures the same way they would any other state
law, potentially taking into account state constitutional principles
and the court’s own precedents? In the cases concerning the 2000
presidential election, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that courts
must place special emphasis on the text of state laws that a
legislature enacts under the Presidential Electors Clause to
regulate presidential elections.92
Some commentators agree with the approach set forth in Bush v.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board93 and the three-Justice
concurrence in Bush v. Gore.94 Others maintain that federal courts
90 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 372–73 (1932) (“[T]here is nothing in [the Elections Clause]
which precludes a State from providing that legislative action in districting the State for
congressional elections shall be subject to the veto power of the Governor as in other cases of
the exercise of the lawmaking power.”).
91 See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
92 See Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam)
(suggesting that, because state legislatures act “by virtue of a direct grant of authority” from
the U.S. Constitution when regulating “the selection of Presidential electors,” the “general
rule” requiring the U.S. Supreme Court to “defer[] to a state court’s interpretation of a state
statute” is inapplicable to such laws); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–13 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (stating that, for a statute that a legislature enacts under the
Presidential Electors Clause, “the text of the election law itself, and not just its interpretation
by the courts of the States, takes on independent significance”).
93 531 U.S. at 76.
94 Bush, 531 U.S. at 111–12 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see Nelson Lund, The Unbearable
Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219, 1262 (2002) (“Whatever authority there
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may overrule a state court’s construction of a state law governing
presidential elections only in the most extreme cases,95 while yet
other scholars contend that courts should construe laws governing
federal elections the same way they would any other state statute.96
Professor Rick Hasen suggested that “reasonable jurists will differ”
over this issue.97 He has also argued, however, that federal and
state courts may apply a “Democracy Canon,” requiring them to
construe laws governing federal elections in favor of allowing
candidates to appear on the ballot, people to cast votes, and disputed
ballots to be counted, even when such outcomes are contrary to the
plain meaning of a statute.98
might be for a state court to ignore the legislature’s directions in other contexts, Article II of
the Constitution appears on its face to forbid such judicial reshaping of the law in connection
with the appointment of presidential electors.”); Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half
Cheers for Bush v Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 663 (2001) (“[T]here is a constitutionallybased federal interest in ensuring that state executive and judicial branches adhere to the
rules for selecting electors established by the legislature, and do not use their interpretive
and enforcement powers to change the rules after the fact.”); Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000:
A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 30 (“Article II may reasonably be interpreted as federalizing disputes over
whether the authority thus granted to state legislatures has been usurped by another branch
of state government.”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000
ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 155–56 (2001) (concluding that, because
Article II designates the legislature as “the site within state government of the power to
appoint electors,” courts may not use their “power to fill statutory gaps and resolve statutory
ambiguities” to instead re-write state laws governing presidential elections).
95 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, “In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct”:
The Outcome in Bush v Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 620 (2001) (opining that a
federal court may review a state court’s “gross deviation from the legislature’s directives” in
a state statute governing federal elections); Friedman, supra note 36, at 841 (arguing that
Article II allows a federal court to reject state courts’ constructions of state laws governing
presidential elections only if they are “clearly implausible,” determined relative to how “the
law stood on Election Day”).
96 See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Article II as Interpretive Theory: Bush v. Gore and the
Retreat from Erie, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 89, 98 (2002) (arguing that the Presidential Electors
Clause might not require special deference to state legislatures, but instead could require
state courts to interpret state law based on “the usual interplay of state statutes, the state
constitution, and judicial interpretations”); Schapiro, supra note 34, at 678 (arguing that “no
federal interests justify the . . . intrusive federal intervention” of U.S. Supreme Court review
of state courts’ interpretations of election statutes).
97 Hasen, supra note 33, at 601.
98 Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 113–14 (2009) (“[C]ourts
should reject arguments that reliance on the Democracy Canon raises Article I or Article II
concerns.”). The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected invitations to specifically address this issue.
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Regardless of how one resolves these ancillary issues, the core of
the independent state legislature doctrine remains: a state
legislature may regulate the manner in which federal elections are
held, except for issues relating to candidate qualifications and, for
congressional elections, voter qualifications. When exercising this
authority, the legislature is subject to the implied internal
restrictions of the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors
Clause themselves, as well as explicit federal constitutional
restrictions such as due process, equal protection, and the voting
rights amendments. State constitutions, however, may not impose
additional substantive restrictions on the scope of legislatures’
authority over federal elections.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE AND PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORS CLAUSE

The history of the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors
Clause is silent on whether state constitutions may impose
substantive limits on the authority of state legislatures over federal
elections. The only definite conclusion that can be drawn is that the
Framers specifically chose to vest power over federal elections with
institutional state legislatures, rather than directly with the people
themselves. The drafting history of these provisions is therefore
inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
term “legislature” as including public referenda or initiatives.99
Otherwise, it neither bolsters nor undermines the case for the
independent state legislature doctrine. The fact that the Framers
may not have expressly discussed a particular application or
consequence of the U.S. Constitution’s language, however, does not
change either the original public meaning of that language or the
reasonable implications that may be drawn from it.
See, e.g., Marks v. Union Cty. Democratic Comm., 541 U.S. 937 (2004) (mem.) (denying
certiorari); Forrester v. N.J. Democratic Party, Inc., 537 U.S. 1083 (2002) (mem.) (denying
certiorari).
99 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 808 (2015)
(holding that congressional “redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in
accordance with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the
referendum”); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916) (holding that the
Elections Clause does not prevent a state’s voters from using the public referendum process
to reject congressional redistricting plans adopted by the state legislature).
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1. The Elections Clause. At the Constitutional Convention,
Edmund Randolph’s initial resolutions concerning Congress
specified that members of the first chamber would be elected by the
people.100 An early draft of the Constitution compiled by the
Committee on Detail stated that elections for the first house of the
national legislature “shall be biennially held on the same day
through the same state(s): except in case of accidents, and where an
adjournment to the succeeding day may be necessary.”101 The places
for such elections “shall be fixed by the (national) legislatures from
time to time, or on their default by the national legislature.”102 The
Committee considered including a provision that votes be given “by
ballot, unless 2/3 of the national legislature shall choose to vary the
mode,” but deleted it.103 Finally, the draft provided that “the
legislature of Each state shall (send) appoint two (members)
senators using their discretion as to the time and manner of
choosing them.”104 This precursor treats the “legislature” that
appoints U.S. Senators as the same entity that may determine the
time and manner for such appointments. It supports the notion that
the term “Legislature” means the same thing in both Article I, § 3,
which allows the state legislature to appoint the state’s U.S.
Senators,105 and the Elections Clause, which grants the legislature
authority over the time, place, and manner of Senate elections.
The Convention did not debate any of these provisions. The next
draft condensed them together, stating, “The Times and Places and
the Manner of holding the Elections (for) of the Members of each
House shall be prescribed by the Legislatures of each State; but
their Provisions concerning them may, at any Time, be altered and

See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 58, at 20 (quoting Randolph’s proposed resolution
“that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the
people of the several States”).
101 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 58, at 139. The original document was “in the
handwriting of Edmund Randolph.” Id. at 137 n.6. Text that appears “in parentheses [was]
crossed out in the original,” and text in “italics represent[s] changes made in Randolph’s
handwriting.” Id.
102 Id. at 139.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 141.
105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (stating that U.S. Senators “shall be . . . chosen by the
Legislature” of each state).
100
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superseded by the Legislature of the United States.”106 After minor
amendments,107 the Elections Clause assumed its current form.
The Letters from a Federal Farmer, published during the
ratification debates, interpreted the Elections Clause as referring to
institutional state legislatures.108 The Letters refer to legislatures
as being elected on a yearly basis, and discuss whether the
chambers of a legislature comprised of “two branches” would vote
separately when appointing a U.S. Senator, or instead meet
together in joint session and hold a single vote.109 Chancellor James
Kent’s Commentaries on American Law similarly explains that the
Elections Clause refers to the state legislature “in the true technical
sense, being the two houses acting in their separate and organized
capacities.”110
The Federalist Papers and Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries
on the Constitution set forth the Framers’ rationale for the Elections
Clause. They explain that the Constitution could have allocated
power to regulate federal elections in three ways: “wholly in the
national legislature; or wholly in the state legislatures; or primarily
in the latter, and ultimately in the former.”111 The third option was
best because it left primary responsibility with state legislatures,
yet allowed Congress to prevent abuse that would “hazard the
safety and permanence of the Union.”112 Expanding upon this

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 58, at 155; accord id. at 165.
See id. at 229, 567, 613.
108 Letter XII from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Jan. 12, 1788), in AN ADDITIONAL
NUMBER OF LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 100, 110 (Quadrangle
Books, Inc. 1962) (1788) (arguing that election regulation “ought to be left to the state
legislatures,” which are “far nearest to the people”).
109 Id. at 109–10.
110 1 CHANCELLOR JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 261–62 (John M. Gould
ed., 14th ed. 1896); see also id. at 261 (“[Senators] were to be chosen by the legislatures, and
the legislature was to prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections for
senators . . . .”).
111 2 STORY, supra note 79, § 814, at 281; accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 326 (Alexander
Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
112 2 STORY, supra note 79, § 814, at 282; THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra note 111, at 326
(Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that leaving “an exclusive power of regulating elections for
the National Government, in the hands of the State Legislatures, would leave the existence
of the Union entirely at their mercy”).
106
107
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sentiment, Federalist No. 59 declared, “[E]very Government ought
to contain in itself the means of its own preservation.”113
2. The Presidential Electors Clause. Throughout debates over the
development of the Presidential Electors Clause, delegates
repeatedly distinguished between granting power to state
legislatures and to the people.114 In one of the earliest discussions
at the Convention concerning the Presidency, James Wilson argued
that the President should be directly elected by the people “without
the intervention of the State Legislatures . . . in order to make [the
office] as independent as possible . . . of the States.”115 Elbridge
Gerry worried, however, that denying states a role in the process
would cause “alarm,” and instead suggested “letting the
Legislatures nominate, and the [presidential] electors appoint,” the
President.116 He questioned whether the people should be permitted
to “act directly even in (the) choice of electors.”117 The Convention
rejected Wilson’s proposal and instead initially voted to have
Congress—the “national legislature”—appoint the Executive.118
Later, Gouverneur Morris proposed an amendment that the
people be permitted to elect the President.119 He noted other
delegates’ concern that this would enable the “populous” states to
113 THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra note 111, at 325 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis
removed); accord 2 STORY, supra note 79, § 814, at 281; see also 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 58, at 240 (statement of Ghorum) (“It would be as improper [to] take this power from the
Natl. Legislature, as to Restrain the British Parliament from regulating the circumstances
of elections, leaving this business to the Counties themselves.”); The Debates in the
Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Oct. 28,
1787) (statement of Wilson) (“This clause is not only a proper, but necessary one. . . .
[W]ithout this clause, [the federal government] would not possess self-preserving power.”), in
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 79, at 415, 440.
114 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 58, at 109–10 (statement of Madison)
(distinguishing between “the people themselves” and “some existing authority under the
[National] or State Constitutions,” including the “Legislatures of the States,” which “had
betrayed a strong propensity to a variety of pernicious measures”); id. at 114–15 (statement
of Dickenson) (same).
115 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 58, at 69 (statement of Wilson).
116 Id. at 80 (statement of Gerry); see also id. at 176 (pointing out that the first branch of
the national legislature would be “chosen by the people of the States” and the second branch
“by the Legislatures of the States”).
117 Id. at 80.
118 Id. at 81.
119 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 58, at 29 (statement of Morris) (“[The President]
ought to be elected by the people at large . . . .”).
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conspire together to control the presidency. He responded, “The
people of such States cannot combine. If [there] be any combination
it must be among their representatives in the Legislature.”120 Hugh
Williamson opposed the measure, arguing that the difference
between election “by the people and by the legislature” is the same
“as between an appt. by lot, and by choice.”121 The Convention
rejected Morris’ proposal.122
The Convention then summarily rejected a suggestion that the
Executive “be chosen by Electors to be appointed by the several
Legislatures of the individual States” (i.e., the Electoral College),123
changed course by adopting that proposal without debate two days
later,124 and then switched back to having Congress select the
President.125 Further debate on the issue was postponed,126 and the
matter was referred to a committee comprised of one representative
from each state (the “Committee of eleven”).127 The committee
proposed the language that appears in the Constitution: “Each
State shall appoint in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a
number of electors . . . .”128 Morris explained that the committee
made this change because the delegates were both dissatisfied with
allowing Congress to appoint the President and “anxious” about
letting the people do so.129
During the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson’s
discussions of the Presidential Electors Clause continued to

Id.
Id. at 32 (statement of Williamson).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 22.
124 Id. at 57–58 (statement of Ellsworth).
125 Id. at 99.
126 Id. at 404.
127 Id. at 473. The committee was comprised of one delegate from each of the eleven states
represented at the Convention at the time; Rhode Island never sent delegates, while New
Hampshire’s did not arrive until late July. Id.; see also Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to
the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S.
Constitution, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 476, 480 (discussing the absence of the two
delegations).
128 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 58, at 497.
129 Id. at 500 (statement of Morris).
120
121
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distinguish between the legislature and the people.130 He explained
that the Clause allows the people to vote directly on presidential
electors “[w]ith the approbation of the state legislatures.”131 Kent’s
Commentaries drew the same distinction, explaining, “The
Constitution . . . has not thought it safe or prudent to refer the
election of a President directly and immediately to the people; but
it has confided the power to a small body of electors, appointed in
each state, under the direction of the legislature . . . .”132
Thus, the drafting and ratification histories of the Elections
Clause and Presidential Electors Clause emphasize the Framers’
repeated distinction between a state legislature and direct collective
action by the people of a state. Those histories do not shed light,
however, on whether either the Framers or the greater public
intended or understood those provisions as establishing the
independent state legislature doctrine.
D. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS

Beyond the text of the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors
Clause, as well as the prevailing understanding of those provisions
throughout the nineteenth century,133 four normative rationales
support the independent state legislature doctrine. First, Story’s
Commentaries explain that the Constitution delegated the power to
regulate federal elections to state legislatures in order to give them
flexibility in responding to local needs and exigencies.134 He extolled
legislatures’ ability “to adapt the regulation, from time to time, to
the peculiar local, or political convenience of the states,” even in the
absence of “an extreme necessity, or a very urgent exigency.”135
Allowing state constitutions to shackle legislatures’ discretion
would limit the flexibility that the Convention sought to guarantee.

130 The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution (Dec. 11, 1787) (statement of James Wilson), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES,
supra note 79, at 511–12.
131 Id. at 512.
132 KENT, supra note 110, at 334–35.
133 See infra Parts III–V.
134 See 2 STORY, supra note 79, § 820, at 287–88.
135 Id.
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Second, the Framers deliberately structured the Constitution to
place ultimate responsibility for elections in the political branches
of government.136 Political entities—state legislatures and
Congress—are responsible for determining most of the rules for
congressional elections;137 state legislatures are similarly
responsible for deciding how to select presidential electors.138 Each
chamber of Congress is the sole judge of its members’ elections and
returns.139 Congress is likewise responsible for determining the
outcomes of presidential elections.140 The Constitution grants the
House and Senate authority to count electoral votes141 and reject
any they deem invalid.142 If no candidate for President or Vice
President receives a majority of electoral votes, then the House and
Senate, respectively, determine who will serve.143
These provisions collectively reflect a fundamental structural
decision to treat elections as essentially political matters,144 under
the ultimate control of political—and politically accountable—
entities. Even Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment left
enforcement of voting rights to Congress.145 Subsequent
See Morley, supra note 76, at 90–92 (explaining how the Constitution’s structure treats
federal elections as primarily political matters under the principal control of political
entities).
137 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (granting Congress and state legislatures power over the
“Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” for Congress).
138 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a number of electors . . . .”).
139 Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members . . . .”).
140 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (detailing Congress’s role in counting electoral votes in presidential
elections); see also id. amend. XII.
141 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The President of the Senate shall . . . open all the Certificates, and
the Votes shall then be counted.”); accord id. amend. XII.
142 See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2018) (outlining the procedure for Congress to review and determine
the validity of electoral votes).
143 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; id. amend. XII.
144 Cf. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion) (“Courts ought not
to enter this political thicket.”), abrogated by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding
that an equal protection challenge to legislative redistricting was justiciable).
145 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (specifying that a state that denies or abridges the right to
vote will have its representation in the U.S. House reduced proportionately). For contrasting
views of the modern implications of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, compare Franita
Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379,
385 (2014), arguing that Section 2’s extreme remedy of reduction in representation for states
136
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constitutional amendments prohibiting discrimination regarding
voting rights based on certain specified characteristics146 do not
disturb this fundamental allocation of power. It was not until the
mid-twentieth century that the U.S. Supreme Court reinterpreted
the Fourteenth Amendment as creating a broader, judicially
enforceable right to vote.147 Even while asserting constitutional
authority to enforce voting rights, however, the Court has
recognized the Constitution’s delegations of authority in this area
to Congress.148
The independent state legislature doctrine bolsters the
Constitution’s structural allocation of primary authority over
federal elections to the political branches—specifically, to
representative legislative assemblies. The doctrine is not an
anomaly stemming from an ill-considered word in an isolated
constitutional provision or two, but rather a component of a
consistent, pervasive, institutional choice concerning the entities to
be entrusted with ultimate authority over federal elections. If state
constitutions could limit their respective state legislatures’
authority over federal elections, then the courts—particularly state
courts149—would have a larger role in overseeing such elections.
Though the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed skepticism about the
that violate voting rights suggests that Congress has power to adopt less extreme measures
such as the Voting Rights Act, with Morley, supra note 7, at 285, contending that Section 2’s
extreme remedy for voting rights violations suggests that the Constitution implicitly sets a
high threshold for what qualifies as a denial or abridgement of voting rights.
146 See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
147 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax
for state elections on the grounds it violated “the right to vote” protected by the Equal
Protection Clause); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (holding that a state law
prohibiting soldiers stationed in Texas from registering to vote there violated “a right secured
by the Equal Protection Clause”); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1963) (holding that
the Equal Protection Clause requires “all who participate in [an] election . . . to have an equal
vote”); see also Michael T. Morley, Prophylactic Redistricting? Congress’s Section 5 Power and
the New Equal Protection Right to Vote, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2053, 2088–2112 (2018)
(analyzing the development of the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence regarding voting
rights).
148 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (“[T]he Framers gave
Congress the power to do something about partisan gerrymandering in the Elections
Clause.”).
149 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106–07 (1984) (holding
that federal courts may not entertain suits for injunctive relief against state officials for
violations of state law, including state constitutional provisions).
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Framers’ allocation of power over federal elections150 and taken
steps to supersede this allocation,151 the independent state
legislature doctrine is most faithful to the Constitution’s underlying
logic and structure.152
Third, as earlier drafts of the Elections Clause make clear,153 the
power of state legislatures to regulate federal elections was
understood to be co-extensive with Congress’ power to do so.154 The

See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 818–19
(2015) (discounting a precedent arising from the U.S. House of Representatives’ resolution of
an election contest due to partisanship concerns).
151 See supra notes 147 and accompanying text.
152 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7–
8 (1969) (discussing a structuralist approach to constitutional interpretation).
153 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
154 See Debates of the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 25, 1788) (statement of
Davis), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 79, at 61 (“Congress has ultimately no power over
elections, but what is primarily given to the state legislatures.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 59,
supra note 111, at 326 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that the Constitution vests power
to regulate federal elections “primarily” with state legislatures and “ultimately” in Congress);
see also 1 KENT, supra note 110, at 273 (treating the scope of a state legislature’s power and
Congress’s power over federal elections as equivalent); 2 STORY, supra note 79, § 814, at 281–
82 (explaining that the Constitution vests “[t]he regulation of elections” with “the local
governments,” and allows the national government to exercise that authority “in
extraordinary circumstances”).
Indeed, if anything, the Election Clause’s history could be read as suggesting that state
legislatures would have broader power than Congress over federal elections. Some argued
that the Elections Clause allows Congress to step in only if a state either attempts to
undermine the federal government by refusing to hold federal elections or adopts patently
improper or unfair rules. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra note 111, at 326 (Alexander
Hamilton) (explaining that the Elections Clause grants Congress power to regulate federal
elections “whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition necessary
to its safety”); 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 58, at 148 (statement of McHenry)
(explaining that the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate federal elections in
case of “particular exigencies” such as “Insurrection, Invasion, and even to provide against
any disposition that might occur hereafter in any particular State to thwart the measures of
the General Government”); 1 KENT, supra note 110, at 273 (explaining that the Elections
Clause grants Congress power to make or alter rules concerning congressional elections “for
the sake of [its] own preservation,” and “it is to be presumed, [that Congress] will not be
disposed to exercise [such power], except when any state shall neglect or refuse to make
adequate provision for the purpose”); 2 STORY, supra note 79, § 814, at 282 (“[I]n
extraordinary circumstances, the power is reserved to the national government; so that it
may not be abused, and thus hazard the safety and permanence of the union.”); see also The
Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, on the Adoption of the Federal
150
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U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized this symmetry
between state legislatures’ power and congressional power.155 Any
substantive limits that a particular state’s constitution imposes on
the scope of a legislature’s authority, however, would be
inapplicable to Congress. Neither the text nor the history of the
Elections Clause suggests that state legislatures would have
narrower power than Congress over federal elections. Allowing
state constitutions to impose substantive limits on state
legislatures’ authority concerning federal elections would destroy
this symmetry between the power of the legislature and the power
of Congress.
Finally, the Constitution’s delegations of authority to state
legislatures concern important federal interests: the election of
federal officials,156 the ratification of constitutional amendments,157
and requests for federal military intervention.158 As Professor
Vikram Amar recognizes, these are all issues for which the Framers
wanted to establish “smooth, orderly, and uncontroversial” ways to
determine the “validity and legitimacy” of states’ actions.159 James
Iredell, for example, expressed the importance of having “little

Constitution (Nov. 20, 1787) (statement of Wilson), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 79,
at 440–41 (describing scenarios when Congress may intervene in election regulation).
After the Constitution was ratified, however, a constitutional amendment was introduced
in the First Congress to amend the Elections Clause to state that Congress may not “alter,
modify, or interfere in” state laws governing congressional elections unless a state “shall
refuse or neglect, or be unable, by invasion or rebellion, to make such election.” 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 768 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Burke). The House rejected the
amendment by a vote of twenty-three to twenty-eight. Id. at 772–73.
155 See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367 (1932) (holding that the Elections Clause allows
Congress to make “regulations of the sort which . . . may be provided by the legislature of the
State upon the same subject”); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 386 (1879) (“The State may
make regulations on the subject; Congress may make regulations on the same subject, or may
alter or add to those already made.”); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, 832 (1995) (holding that, if state legislatures were permitted to exercise certain authority
under the Elections Clause, then Congress would be able to exercise the same power).
156 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (appointment of U.S. Senators); id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (Elections
Clause); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (Presidential Electors Clause); id. amend. XVII (allowing the
legislature to authorize a governor to make temporary appointments to fill U.S. Senate
vacancies).
157 Id. art. V.
158 Id. art. IV, § 4.
159 Amar, The People Made Me Do It, supra note 31, at 1073.
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confusion”160 over whether amendments to the U.S. Constitution
have been validly adopted, while George Mason emphasized the
need to avoid “chance and violence.”161
The independent state legislature doctrine makes it far easier to
determine the validity of a state’s exercise of the authority it
received from the U.S. Constitution. When a legislature structures
a congressional election, ratifies a federal constitutional
amendment, or requests federal intervention, its acts may be judged
according to a uniform body of known federal constitutional
standards, subject to ultimate review in the U.S. Supreme Court,
rather than according to potentially esoteric, idiosyncratic, or
otherwise unpredictable state constitutional restrictions.162 It is far
easier for the federal government—and other states—to accept
legislatures’ actions impacting the federal government at face value
when they do not need to consider those acts’ substantive validity
under state constitutions. Thus, to the extent the Elections Clause
and Presidential Electors Clause were adopted to promote certainty
and minimize unnecessary confusion and conflict, the independent
state legislature doctrine furthers those critical goals.

III. STATE PRECEDENTS
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and commentators have largely
overlooked the extent to which various federal and state authorities
applied the independent state legislature doctrine throughout the
Id. (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 79, at 177 (statement of Iredell)).
Id. (quoting 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 58, at 203 (statement of Mason)).
162 See SUTTON, supra note 5, at 17 (“State courts . . . have a freer hand in . . . allowing local
conditions and traditions to affect their interpretation of a constitutional guarantee and the
remedies imposed to implement that guarantee. . . . State constitutional law respects and
honors these differences between and among the States by allowing interpretations of the
fifty state constitutions to account for these differences in culture, geography, and history.”).
The possibility of circuit splits undermines the uniformity of federal standards, but the
U.S. Supreme Court may resolve such conflicts. Moreover, even when differences among
circuits exist, the range of potential federal constitutional defects with a legislature’s actions
is typically far better recognizable than potential state-specific problems under state
constitutions. See Donald L. Beschle, Uniformity in Constitutional Interpretation and the
Background Right to Effective Democratic Governance, 63 IND. L.J. 539, 539 (1988) (“Courts
and commentators . . . widely accept the proposition that federal constitutional norms should
be uniform . . . . Diversity should be expected, perhaps even encouraged, in matters of state
law, both statutory and constitutional.”).
160
161
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nineteenth century. As early as the Massachusetts Constitutional
Convention of 1820, it was understood that state constitutions were
legally incapable of limiting the state legislature’s power over
congressional and presidential elections.163 Throughout the rest of
the century, the admittedly few state courts to consider the issue
generally enforced state laws governing congressional elections,
even when they violated state constitutional provisions.164
A. THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1820
AND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

Neither the state constitutions adopted immediately after the
U.S. Constitution’s ratification, nor those of new states that joined
the Union in the 1790s, contained provisions relating to federal
elections.165 Consistent with the Elections Clause and Presidential
Electors Clause, they left the matter to the plenary discretion of
state legislatures. Some later state constitutions specified
procedures for legislatures to follow to take certain actions relating
to federal elections, such as requiring legislatures to appoint U.S.
Senators in joint session.166 Likewise, state governors that had a
general veto power applied it to state laws regulating federal
elections.167 In general, however, “post-Founding state constitutions
did not explicitly regulate” federal elections or limit legislatures’
power to adopt “‘manner’ legislation.”168
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B–III.D.
165 Smith, supra note 20, at 757–58.
166 See id. at 759–64.
167 Id. at 759–61 (discussing examples from Massachusetts and New York).
168 Id. at 759. Smith identifies a few exceptions: Delaware’s Constitution specified that
voters shall elect federal representatives “at the same places” and “in the same manner” as
state representatives, DEL. CONST. OF 1792, art. VIII, § 2, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 213 (William F. Swindler ed., 1973–79)
[hereinafter SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS]; and the Kentucky Constitution required all elections
to be held by voice vote, KY. CONST. OF 1799, art. VI, § 16, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra at 160. Whether the framers of these state constitutions took into account
the Elections Clause, the Presidential Electors Clause, or the independent state legislature
doctrine is unclear.
Smith also notes that the Maryland Constitution guaranteed free white male citizens the
right to vote for all elected officials, including Representatives and presidential electors. See
Smith, supra note 20, at 758 (citing MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XIV (1810), reprinted in 4
163
164
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The Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1820 is among
the earliest examples of the independent state legislature doctrine
being expressly applied. The Convention was called to replace the
constitution that the state had adopted in 1780, during the
Revolutionary War.169 Attorney James T. Austin, future Attorney
General of Massachusetts, proposed an amendment under which
representatives in the U.S. House and presidential electors would
have been chosen “in such convenient districts as the Legislature
shall by law provide.”170 The amendment would have required the
legislature to draw new districts after every congressional
reapportionment, with no more than two representatives or electors
in each district.171 It barred the legislature from altering those
districts until the next reapportionment.172 The Convention’s
Committee of the Whole rejected the proposed amendment without
much debate.173
The next day, Austin presented essentially the same proposal on
the convention floor.174 He explained that the amendment would
“direct the Legislature in the exercise of the power which is given
them by the [C]onstitution of the United States.”175 It would “limit”
the legislature “in the exercise of their discretion” in redistricting.176
He argued that the people had the right to impose this restriction
because the legislature was “bound to exercise all [its] powers under
the direction of the [state] constitution.”177

SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra at 387). Such voter qualification issues, however, were
outside the scope of both the Elections Clause and the independent state legislature doctrine.
See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text.
169 JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, CHOSEN
TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS 3 (Boston Daily Advertiser, rev. ed. 1853)
[hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE 1820 MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION]
(explaining that a convention of delegates had been convened to revise the Massachusetts
Constitution).
170 Id. at 104 (Nov. 27, 1820) (statement of Austin).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 106 (Nov. 28, 1820) (statement of Austin).
175 Id. at 107.
176 Id.
177 Id.; see also id. (discussing “the right of the people to instruct the Legislature in the
manner of exercising their discretion”).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

39

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 [2020], Art. 2

40

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1

Justice Joseph Story, a delegate to the Convention, responded
that the proposed amendment was “plainly a violation of the [U.S.]
[C]onstitution.”178 He explained that the Convention did not “have
a right to insert in our [state] constitution a provision which controls
or destroys a discretion . . . which must be exercised by the
Legislature, in virtue of powers confided to it by the constitution of
the United States.”179 The Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution
grants legislatures “unlimited discretion” over the manner in which
representatives are elected.180 Likewise, the Presidential Electors
Clause affords them the same “unlimited” discretion over the
selection of presidential electors.181 The proposed amendment
“destroy[s] this freedom of choice” and “assumes a control over the
Legislature which the constitution of the United States does not
justify.”182 The legislature is “bound to exercise [the] authority” it
receives from the U.S. Constitution “according to its own views of
public policy and principle,” without substantive limitations.183
Daniel Webster, also serving as a delegate, agreed.184 He
explained that “it would not be well by a provision of [the state]
constitution, to regulate the mode in which the Legislature should
exercise a power conferred on it by another Constitution.”185
Following these speeches, the Convention rejected Austin’s
motion.186 Thus, the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of
1820 provides a stark example of how the independent state
legislature doctrine was regarded when the issue was affirmatively
raised and debated.

Id. at 110 (statement of J. Story).
Id. at 109; see also id. (declaring that the state constitutional convention cannot
“narrow[] or contract[] the powers delegated” by the U.S. Constitution to the state
legislature).
180 Id. at 110.
181 Id.
182 Id.; see also id. (arguing that the proposed amendment “affect[s] to control the
Legislature in the exercise of its legitimate powers” under the U.S. Constitution).
183 Id.
184 Id. at 112 (statement of Webster) (“He would wish that the constitution of the State
should have as little connection with the constitution of the United States as possible.”).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 113.
178
179
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B. NEW HAMPSHIRE AND ABSENTEE MILITARY VOTING

Litigation involving the independent state legislature doctrine
arose periodically during the Civil War as state legislatures enacted
laws allowing soldiers serving away from home to vote.187 Several
state constitutions required voters to cast their ballots in person in
the precincts in which they were registered.188 Absentee voting
laws, even for members of the military, violated these provisions.
Consequently, “in States where the place of voting was fixed by the
[state] Constitution, an amendment to the [state] Constitution was
necessary before a law could be passed authorizing soldiers to vote
in the field for State officers.”189 Due to the independent state
legislature doctrine, however, “no amendment was necessary to
enable the Legislature to prescribe for voting in the field for
presidential electors and representatives.”190
In 1864, for example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued
an advisory opinion affirming that military voters could cast
absentee ballots for federal offices.191 It declared that the election of
members of Congress and presidential electors “is governed wholly
by the Constitution of the United States as the paramount law, and
the Constitution of this State has no concern with the question,
except so far as it is referred to and adopted by the Constitution of
the United States.”192 The court held that no “valid legal objections”
existed to the legislature’s exercise of its “unlimited authority” and

187 See JOSIAH HENRY BENTON, VOTING IN THE FIELD: A FORGOTTEN CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL
WAR 314–15 (1915) (providing a state-by-state examination of Civil-War-era absentee voting
laws for military voters).
188 John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the Secret Ballot:
Challenges for Election Reform, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 498 (2003).
189 BENTON, supra note 187, at 11–12.
190 Id. at 12.
191 Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H. 595, 596, 599 (1864); see also Opinion of the Judges, 37
Vt. 665, 677 (1864) (noting, in the course of upholding an absentee military voting law for
federal offices, that the power to prescribe the time and place of federal elections “rests wholly
in the discretion of the legislature to establish . . . by law,” and that “[t]he whole subject is
entrusted [by the Elections Clause] to the state legislature, subject to the control of
[C]ongress”).
192 Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H. at 599; see also id. at 600 (stating that the U.S.
Constitution leaves the appointment of electors “wholly to the discretion of the State
legislature”).
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“unqualified discretion” under the Presidential Electors Clause.193
It likewise concluded that the Elections Clause allowed the
legislature to determine the time, place, and manner of voting for
the U.S. House of Representatives, “untrammeled” by potentially
contrary provisions of the state constitution.194
The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s opinion stands as one of
the nineteenth century’s clearest, most emphatic endorsements of
the independent state legislature doctrine.195 When the court
considered another absentee voting law in the early twentieth
century, however, it expressed doubt about this conclusion,
exemplifying the shift in attitude toward the doctrine that occurred
at the turn of the century.196
C. RHODE ISLAND AND PLURALITY ELECTIONS

The Rhode Island Supreme Court similarly applied the
independent state legislature doctrine in 1887 when resolving a
dispute over a contested congressional election.197 The state
constitution’s Majority Vote Clause provided, “[I]n all elections held
by the people under this constitution, a majority of all the electors
voting shall be necessary to the election of the person voted for.”198
The court stated that this clause might apply to congressional
elections, since another provision within the same article of the
state constitution specified that the method of voting for various
offices, including “representatives to [C]ongress[,] shall be by
ballot.”199 A state statute, however, provided that only a plurality

193 Id. at 600; see also id. (“The whole discretion as to the manner of the appointment is
lodged, in the broadest and most unqualified terms, in the legislature.”).
194 Id. at 605.
195 Cf. Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. at 677 (discussing the legislature’s complete discretion
to regulate congressional elections under the Elections Clause, without expressly addressing
whether the state constitution may constrain it).
196 In re Opinion of the Justices, 113 A. 293, 298, 299 (N.H. 1921) (reaffirming the Court’s
earlier conclusion with regard to presidential electors but adding that the Court was “unable
to say the [state statutory] provisions would be held valid [under the state constitution] as to
the election of Senators and Representatives in Congress”).
197 In re Plurality Elections, 8 A. 881 (R.I. 1887) (responding to a certified question from
the state’s house of representatives).
198 Id. at 882 (quoting R.I. CONST. art. VIII, § 10).
199 Id. (quoting R.I. CONST. art. VIII, § 2).
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was necessary to win special elections, including U.S. House
races.200
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, assuming the
Majority Vote Clause applied to congressional elections, it was “of
no effect,” except insofar as the state legislature “voluntarily
deferred” to it “as an indication of the popular will.”201 The court
explained that the provision violated the U.S. Constitution’s
Elections Clause.202 The Majority Vote Clause could not validly
“impose a restraint upon the power of prescribing the manner of
holding [congressional] elections which is given to the legislature by
the [C]onstitution of the United States without restraint.”203 Thus,
a state law concerning congressional elections that violated the
state constitution was nevertheless valid and enforceable.204
The court reached the same conclusion regarding the
Presidential Electors Clause.205 After quoting that provision, the
court declared, “The manner of appointment is left entirely to the
legislatures.”206 Again, however, when the Rhode Island Supreme
Court considered the validity of a proposed military absentee voting
law in the early twentieth century, it expressed much more
uncertainty about the independent state legislature doctrine’s
validity.207 Like the New Hampshire Supreme Court,208 the Rhode
Island court recognized that a contrasting view of the issue had
arisen.209

See id.
Id.
202 Id. (holding that the Majority Vote Clause “is manifestly in conflict with [the Elections
Clause]”).
203 Id.
204 Id. (holding the state statute “lawful and constitutional, and that any representative
elected under [the statute] will be allowed to have his seat regardless of [the state
constitution’s Majority Vote Clause]”).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 In re Opinion to the Governor, 103 A. 513, 516 (R.I. 1918) (stating that “in carrying out
this direction of the federal Constitution the [state] Legislature should not act independently
and in disregard of the provisions of the state Constitution”).
208 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
209 Opinion to the Governor, 103 A. at 515–16 (citing a South Dakota case and two
Congressional election contests).
200
201
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D. MISSISSIPPI AND THE TIMING OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

The Mississippi Supreme Court also applied the doctrine in 1873
in resolving a dispute over the timing of state and federal
elections.210 The Mississippi Constitution required the state to hold
a “general election” every two years in November.211 It did not
specify either the years in which elections were to be held, or the
year in which the first such election was to be held.212 Nor did the
state constitution expressly identify the offices to be elected at
general elections.213 The Mississippi legislature enacted a law
requiring state legislators, as well as other state and county
officials, to be elected starting in 1871 and every two or four years
thereafter, depending on the length of the office’s term.214 The law
further specified that a congressional election would be held in 1872
and every two years thereafter.215
The Mississippi Supreme Court recognized that the state
constitution required general elections to be held biennially, but the
law passed by the legislature required annual elections (albeit for
different offices).216 The court pointed out that the Elections Clause
allowed Congress to schedule congressional elections for whenever
it wished, regardless of what any state’s constitution said or the
timing of state and county elections.217 The power that the Elections
Clause granted to state legislatures to determine the timing of their
states’ congressional elections, the court reasoned, was just as
broad.218 Thus, the state constitution’s requirement for biennial
general elections did not limit the state legislature’s discretion
State v. Williams, 49 Miss. 640 (1873).
Id. at 665 (citing MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 7).
212 Id. (acknowledging that “the constitution is silent as to the year in which the election is
to be held”).
213 See id. at 665–66.
214 Id. at 666.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 See id.
218 Id. at 666–67 (holding that, since the state constitution could not limit Congress’s power
to schedule Mississippi’s congressional elections, the state constitution should not “have that
effect, when the legislature has supplied the omission of Congress to prescribe the time for
the election of members to the national legislature”); id. at 681 (Simrall, J., concurring)
(recognizing that a state constitutional convention “could not fix absolutely and permanently
the time of electing representatives in Congress”).
210
211
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under the Elections Clause to determine when congressional
elections would be held.
Thus, in the few examples throughout the nineteenth century
where state supreme courts squarely confronted the independent
state legislature doctrine, they invariably accepted it. Different
states applied the doctrine at different times throughout the
century to a wide variety of issues. The next Part demonstrates that,
throughout that same period, Congress generally was just as
accepting of the doctrine.

IV. CONGRESSIONAL PRECEDENTS
During the nineteenth century, both chambers of Congress
endorsed and applied the independent state legislature doctrine.219
Most examples arose in the context of the House’s or Senate’s
exercise of its authority under Article I, § 5 of the Constitution to
resolve election contests concerning its members.220 The Senate also
embraced the doctrine when considering potential reforms to the
electoral college.221
As this Part demonstrates, when Congress applied the doctrine,
it faithfully distinguished between regulation of the “Manner” in
which congressional elections were held, which was subject to the
legislature’s plenary power under the Elections Clause222 (and not
subject to review under state constitutions223), and voter
qualifications for congressional elections, which were within the
power of the state as an entity under the Voter Qualifications
Clause224 (and therefore could be controlled by state

Despite this history, Congress, too, largely abandoned the doctrine by the early
twentieth century. See, e.g., DAVISON VS. GILBERT, H.R. REP. NO. 56-3000, at 1 (1901)
(reporting that a state law creating congressional districts “was not in contravention of the
Kentucky constitution, and . . . was, as far as we have authority to inquire, properly passed
by the legislature”), no subsequent House action.
220 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (providing that each chamber of Congress may determine the
“Elections, Returns and Qualifications” of its members).
221 See infra Section IV.D.
222 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
223 See infra Sections IV.A–IV.D.
224 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (stating that voters for members of Congress “shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature”).
219
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constitutions225). Consistent with the doctrine, the chambers of
Congress generally declined to enforce state constitutions’
substantive restrictions on the scope of legislatures’ authority over
federal elections. The chambers nevertheless typically enforced
state constitutions’ procedural requirements concerning the
legislative process that legislatures had to follow to exercise that
power. Thus, the House enforced procedural provisions of state
constitutions requiring bills to be read a certain number of times or
over a certain number of days,226 while the Senate Committee on
Privileges and Elections recommended enforcing state
constitutions’ procedures governing legislatures’ appointments of
U.S. Senators.227
There were several contests in which the House acknowledged
that one of the parties had invoked the doctrine, but found it
unnecessary to address the issue because the contest could be
resolved on other grounds.228 There were also a few cases in which,
rather than invoking the doctrine, the chamber simply rejected a
state constitutional challenge on the merits, especially when the
challenge was insubstantial and could be summarily rejected.229 It
See infra Section IV.E.
CALIFORNIA CONTESTED-ELECTION CASES, H.R. REP. NO. 49-2338, at 1, 4–5 (1886)
(deferring to a decision of the California Supreme Court upholding the state’s new
congressional districts, because a state constitutional provision requiring bills to be read
before the legislature three times did not apply to amendments to pending bills), resolutions
proposed by committee report adopted without debate, 17 CONG. REC. 4381 (1886).
227 DAVID T. CORBIN AND M.C. BUTLER, S. REP. NO. 45-707, at 12, 21 (1879) (majority report)
(concluding that the South Carolina House of Representatives had satisfied the South
Carolina constitution’s quorum requirements at the time it appointed a U.S. Senator), election
contest withdrawn, 8 CONG. REC. 2028 (1879).
228 See, e.g., F.M. DAVIS V. T.W. SIMS, H.R. REP. NO. 58-1382, at 10 (1904) (stating that it
was unnecessary to decide “whether the Federal Constitution can confer upon a State
legislature a power to act in conflict with the State constitution”), resolution proposed by
committee report adopted, 38 CONG. REC. 2809 (1904); see also 38 CONG. REC. 2805 (1904)
(statement of Rep. Olmsted) (“We have not . . . found it necessary . . . to pass upon the
proposition . . . that . . . the legislature derives its power to fix the time, place, and manner of
holding elections for Senators and Representatives from the Federal Constitution and can
not be controlled by the State constitution in the exercise of that power.”).
229 See DAVISON VS. GILBERT, H.R. REP. NO. 56-3000, at 1 (1901) (finding “no difficulty in
arriving at the conclusion that [the relevant state election law], was not in contravention of
the Kentucky constitution”), no subsequent House action; NATHAN FRANK AGAINST JOHN M.
GLOVER, H.R. REP. NO. 50-1887, at 2 (1888) (stating that the committee was “united in the
opinion that the [state] law [was] constitutional”), resolutions proposed by committee report
225
226
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appears that the House Committees on Elections preferred
demonstrating that congressional elections were held in compliance
with both the state constitution and state statute, when possible.
Where unavoidable conflicts arose concerning the time, place, or
manner of congressional elections, however, state statutes
controlled over state constitutions.
In the twentieth century, the chambers of Congress did not
expressly repudiate the doctrine, but instead reformulated it into a
discretionary refusal to consider state constitutional challenges to
the validity of state laws regulating federal elections.230 For
example, in Gerling v. Dunn, the contestant challenged the election
on the grounds that New York’s use of voting machines violated the
state constitution.231 The House Committee on Elections declined to
consider the issue, declaring, “It has not been and should never be
the policy of the House of Representatives to pass upon the validity
of State laws under which elections are held when the complaint is
that the legislative enactment is contrary to the provisions of the
State constitution.”232 In extreme cases of pervasive, structural
adopted without debate, 19 CONG. REC. 5182–83 (1888); MCLEAN VS. BROADHEAD, H.R. REP.
NO. 48-2613, at 4 (1885) (“The [state] constitution commands the general assembly to enact
a registry law, and in order to compel obedience to the law the legislature clearly had the
right to say that the failure to register should be conclusive evidence that such person was
not a legal voter.”), no subsequent House action.
230 See, e.g., ELECTION CONTEST CASE OF WALTER B. HUBER, CONTESTANT, AGAINST
WILLIAM H. AYRES, CONTESTEE, FOURTEENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF OHIO, H.R. REP.
NO. 82-906, at 2 (1951) (majority report) (dismissing an election challenge for failure to
exhaust state-law remedies, where the contestant alleged that the ballot order of
congressional candidates’ names had not been rotated as required by the state constitution),
resolution proposed by committee report adopted without debate, 97 CONG. REC. 10,479 (1951).
231 CONTESTED ELECTION CASE, GERLING V. DUNN, H.R. REP. NO. 65-1074, at 2 (1919),
resolution proposed by committee report adopted without debate, 57 CONG. REC. 3578 (1919).
232 Id. at 2; see also CONTESTED ELECTION CASE OF JAMES D. SALTS V. SAM C. MAJOR, H.R.
REP. NO. 66-961, at 4 (1920) (declining to consider the contestant’s argument that a state law
requiring ballots to be numbered in a manner that allowed the voters who cast them to be
identified violated the state constitution), resolutions proposed by committee report adopted,
59 CONG. REC. 7231 (1920). Less notably, the House would also decline to consider state
constitutional violations when the party raising the issue could not show they were sufficient
to affect the election’s outcome. See, e.g., CONTESTED ELECTION CASE OF CAMPBELL V.
DOUGHTON, H.R. REP. NO. 67-882, at 7 (1922) (“[W]hen acts alleged to have violated the
provisions of a State constitution do not appear to have changed the result, either by
themselves or in combination with statutory misdemeanor, the House is not justified in
declaring a seat vacant.”), debated without a vote, 62 CONG. REC. 7808–18 (1922).
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unfairness, however, the twentieth century House nevertheless
enforced state constitutional restrictions.233 Thus, Congress—like
state courts—has substantially changed its approach to the
independent state legislature doctrine since the nineteenth century.
A. THE PLACE AND MANNER OF ELECTIONS

The best-known example of a chamber of Congress applying the
independent state legislature doctrine is Baldwin v.
Trowbridge234—the election contest that the majority and
dissenting opinions in Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission debated.235 The Michigan Constitution provided that a
person must “offer[] to vote” in the “township or ward” of his
residence.236 In 1864, because many Michigan residents were
fighting outside of the state in the Civil War, the legislature passed
a law allowing any qualified voter serving in the military to vote,
“whether at the time of voting he shall be within the limits of this
State or not.”237 Many soldiers cast absentee ballots from other
states.238
The House Committee on Elections explained that, if the
absentee votes were counted, Trowbridge would prevail; if they were
excluded, Baldwin would win.239 The Committee recognized the
conflict between the state constitution, which required people to
vote in person, and the state statute, which permitted absentee

233 See, e.g., CONTESTED-ELECTION CASE OF PAUL V. HARRISON, H.R. REP. NO. 67-1101, at 9
(1922) (“[T]here was such an utter, complete and reckless disregard of the mandatory
provisions of the fundamental law of the State of Virginia involving the essentials of a valid
election, that . . . there was no legal election in those precincts.”), resolutions proposed by
committee report adopted, 64 CONG. REC. 545–47 (1922).
234 H.R. REP. NO. 39-13, at 3 (1866) (majority report), resolution proposed by committee
report adopted, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 845 (1866).
235 Compare Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787,
818–19 (2015) (rejecting Baldwin’s relevance), with id. at 838 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Baldwin to demonstrate the independent state legislature doctrine’s historical
pedigree).
236 H.R. REP. NO. 39-13, at 1 (quoting MICH. CONST. art. VII, § 1).
237 Id. (quoting Act of Feb. 5, 1864).
238 Id. (“Under this act . . . a large number of votes were cast by soldiers outside the limits
of the State.”).
239 Id. at 1–2.
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voting.240 It then observed that the Elections Clause grants power
to regulate congressional elections specifically to the state’s
legislature.241 It declared that the term “legislature” does not refer
broadly to the “legislative power of the State,” but rather specifically
to “the legislature eo nomine, as known in the political history of the
country.”242 The Committee added that the Constitution’s other
mentions of a “legislature” refer exclusively to institutional state
legislatures.243 The term does not include a state’s constitutional
convention.244
Moreover, even if state constitutional provisions governing
federal elections were presumptively enforceable in the absence of
legislation on an issue, they could not limit the institutional
legislature’s authority under the Elections Clause to enact its own
contrary laws.245 At most, a state constitutional provision specifying
the place where voters must cast their ballots was enforceable as a
default rule until superseded by a statute from the legislature. The
Committee also noted that rules concerning the location of polling
places concerned the “place” of elections, rather than voter
qualifications which the Elections Clause does not empower the
legislature to regulate.246 Accordingly, because the state
constitution could not circumscribe the institutional legislature’s
authority under the Elections Clause to regulate the place of
elections, the state law authorizing absentee voting was valid.
Accordingly, the Committee recommended that the House seat
Trowbridge.247 The Committee’s dissenting members also issued a
240 Id. at 2 (noting that the state constitution “plainly prohibits what the legislature as
plainly permits”).
241 Id. (noting that “power is conferred upon the legislature” under the Elections Clause).
242 Id.
243 Id. at 2–3.
244 See id. at 2 (explaining that the “framers recognized a wide difference between a
continuing legislature and a convention temporarily clothed with power to prescribe
fundamental law,” and that “the words ‘legislature’ and ‘convention’ are both used to denote
different legislative bodies”).
245 Id. at 3 (“[T]he people of Michigan had no power to enlarge or restrict the language of
the constitution of the United States.”).
246 Id. (acknowledging that states may exercise “the power to prescribe the qualifications
of electors . . . by an organic convention,” but rejecting the premise that “the place of holding
the election for a representative in Congress may be prescribed as one of the electoral
qualifications”).
247 Id.
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minority report that rejected the independent state legislature
doctrine and contended that the Michigan Constitution precluded
counting the absentee votes.248
During floor debates, several representatives defended
Trowbridge’s right to be seated, expressly endorsing and applying
the independent state legislature doctrine.249 Representative
Beaman, for example, declared that the absentee voting law was
valid as applied to federal elections, regardless of whether it
violated the state constitution and even if it was unenforceable in
state and local races.250 “Michigan cannot control nor limit an
express provision of the [U.S.] Constitution,” he added.251 The House
voted
overwhelmingly
against
the
minority
report’s
recommendations by a vote of 30–108, with forty-four members not
voting.252 The House then seated Trowbridge in accordance with the
majority report by voice vote.253
BALDWIN VS. TROWBRIDGE, H.R. REP. NO. 39-14, at 5 (1866) (dissenting report).
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 816 (1866) (statement of Rep. Beaman)
(“The Legislature, in providing the times, places, and manner of elections of Representatives,
does not derive its authority from the people of the State through their constitution, but from
the Constitution of the United States. This delegation of power is not in terms conveyed
through the people of the State, nor the constitution of the State, but it is conferred directly
upon the Legislature.”); id. (reiterating that a legislature’s power to regulate federal elections
is “placed beyond the control of State constitutions”); id. at 845 (statement of Rep.
Shellabarger) (contending that, because the legislature receives its power to regulate federal
elections from the Elections Clause, allowing the legislature to change election details set
forth in the state constitution “do[es] not override the constitution of any State”); see also id.
at 841 (statement of Trowbridge) (contending that a state constitution may not “obtain a
control” over the authority to determine the time, place, and manner of federal elections that
“it is expressly restrained and prohibited from exercising” under the Elections Clause); id.
at 844 (statement of Rep. Scofield) (“[T]he Constitution of the United States is supreme, and
that . . . of Michigan must yield.”); id. (statement of Rep. Davis) (explaining that the U.S.
Constitution “took away from every State constitution any power which conflicted [with it]”).
250 Id. at 816 (statement of Rep. Beaman) (arguing that a state constitutional provision “in
conflict with the act of the Legislature, which had the authority, sanction, and command even
of the Federal Constitution . . . was absolutely null and void”).
251 Id. Beaman also recognized the distinction between voter qualifications for
congressional elections, which were subject to state constitutional restrictions, and “times,
places, and manner” regulations, which were not. Id. at 817; see also id. at 843 (statement of
Rep. Scofield) (“The Legislature, by the Constitution of the United States, fixes the place
where the ballot-box shall be kept; that is, where the election shall be held. The State fixes
the qualification of voters . . . .” (emphasis added)).
252 Id. at 845.
253 Id.
248
249
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Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s skepticism about the validity
of Baldwin,254 the precedent powerfully supports the independent
state legislature doctrine. The doctrine’s applicability was the only
issue in the election contest: it was the focus of both the majority
and minority reports of the House Committee on Elections, and the
House held extensive floor debates over the doctrine for more than
two days.255 The contest involved a direct and dispositive conflict
between a state constitutional provision and a state statute
regulating a federal election. A decisive majority of the House
concluded that the Elections Clause required it to follow the state
statute rather than the contrary state constitutional provision.
Baldwin distinguished a precedent that the minority report
claimed had rejected the independent state legislature doctrine:
Shiel v. Thayer.256 In Shiel, the Oregon state constitution had
required general elections, including for U.S. Representative, to be
held biennially, on the first Monday of June, starting in 1858.257
Shiel received a majority of votes at a congressional election held in
June 1860.258 Thayer had won a majority of votes at another
congressional election held the following November.259 The latter
election had been conducted simultaneously with Oregon’s
presidential election without any apparent statutory or
constitutional authorization.260 The majority of the House
Committee on Elections held that the June election was the only
congressional election authorized by any state legal provisions.261 It
went further, however, declaring that the state constitution placed
254 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 818
(2015) (“[I]t was perhaps not entirely accidental that the candidate the Committee declared
winner in Baldwin belonged to the same political party as all but one member of the House
Committee majority responsible for the decision.”).
255 See supra notes 236–253 and accompanying text.
256 See BALDWIN VS. TROWBRIDGE, H.R. REP. NO. 39-13, at 3 (1866) (majority report) (citing
GEORGE K. SHIEL VS. ANDREW J. THAYER, H.R. REP. NO. 37-4 (1861), resolutions proposed by
committee report adopted, CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1861)), resolution
proposed by committee report adopted, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 845 (1866).
257 SHIEL, H.R. REP. NO. 37-4, at 2.
258 Id. at 1.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 1–2 (“[T]he election held for representative in Congress on the first Monday in
June, 1860, was held in pursuance of, and in conformity with, the constitution and laws of
Oregon . . . .”).
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the time for holding congressional elections “beyond the control of
the legislature.”262 Accordingly, it concluded that Shiel was entitled
to be seated.263
Neither the Committee nor the floor debate in Shiel mentioned
the Elections Clause, discussed the Constitution’s delegation of
power to state legislatures, or considered the independent state
legislature doctrine.264 Moreover, the Committee’s assertion about
state constitutions was dicta because the election contest did not
involve a conflict between a state constitution and state statute.265
Baldwin partly endorsed Shiel by recognizing that a state
constitutional convention could be considered a legislature, thereby
making the state constitution a default source of law regulating
congressional elections.266 But, contrary to Shiel, Baldwin
concluded that a state constitutional convention would have no
authority to preclude the institutional legislature from exercising
its power under the Elections Clause to change the rules governing
congressional elections.267 Thus, Baldwin interprets Shiel to mean
that state constitutional provisions may govern federal elections in
the absence of contrary statutes, but they cannot limit the scope of
an institutional legislature’s power.
Shiel is the strongest piece of evidence against the notion that
the independent state legislature doctrine embodied the prevailing
understanding of the Elections Clause in the nineteenth century.
The fact that the Elections Committee did not consider the issue in
Shiel cuts both ways, however. On the one hand, the House’s
apparent willingness to accept the Committee’s reasoning suggests

Id. at 3.
Id.
264 See id. at 1–3.
265 Id. at 3 (noting that a bill to reschedule congressional elections during presidential
election years “never became a law”); see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 839 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Shiel
“did not involve a conflict between a state legislative act and a state constitutional provision”).
266 BALDWIN VS. TROWBRIDGE, H.R. REP. NO. 39-13, at 3 (1866) (stating that Michigan’s
state constitutional convention might “be considered a legislature by construction”), resolution
proposed by committee report adopted, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 845 (1866).
267 Id. (concluding that, even if the Elections Clause allowed a state constitutional
convention to include rules governing congressional elections in the state constitution, such
provisions could not “tie the hands of [the convention’s] successors” by restricting the
institutional legislature’s authority to adopt different rules).
262
263
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that the doctrine may not have been universally accepted. On the
other hand, the fact that the Elections Clause was not even
discussed undermines Shiel’s persuasiveness as a precedent for
construing that provision. Had the Clause been raised, the House
would have had to explicitly grapple with its language and meaning.
A final precedent that offers far less insight into the independent
state legislature doctrine’s vitality is Donnelly v. Washburn.268 In
that contest, the House Committee on Elections concluded that the
contestant was not entitled to the seat at issue, but could not reach
a consensus on whether the prevailing candidate was entitled to
retain his seat.269 Moreover, the Committee could not coalesce
around a majority report, but rather issued two reports, each signed
by five members.270 The House ultimately did not take any action in
the matter.271
In Donnelly, the congressional election in Minnesota’s third
congressional district had been infested with bribery, intimidation,
and voter fraud.272 State law required Minneapolis and St. Paul to
number their ballots.273 Prior to the election, a state trial court had
held that this law violated the Minnesota Constitution’s
requirement that elections be conducted by ballot.274 The court
inferred that the state constitution implicitly required ballots to be
secret, unmarked, and untraceable to particular voters.275 Pursuant
to that ruling, election judges in both cities met and decided not to
number ballots.276 Election judges in seven precincts in
Minneapolis, however, nevertheless wrote voters’ registration
numbers on their ballots.277 This decision raised concerns about
H.R. REP. NO. 46-1791 (1880), recommitted to committee, 10 CONG. REC. 4622 (1880).
2 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 62, § 945, at 231.
270 Compare H.R. REP. NO. 46-1791, at 1–32 (report submitted by Rep. Manning), with id.
at 33–79 (minority report submitted by Rep. Keifer); see also 10 CONG. REC. 4621 (1880)
(statement of Rep. Manning) (calling the initial report the “views of certain members of the
committee”); id. (statement of Rep. Keifer) (emphasizing that neither report was “signed by
a majority of the committee”).
271 See 10 CONG. REC. 4622 (1880) (recommitting the report to the committee).
272 H.R. REP. NO. 46-1791, at 13–14 (report submitted by Rep. Manning) (discussing
bribery); id. at 16, 21–23 (discussing intimidation); id. at 24–31 (discussing fraud).
273 Id. at 17.
274 Id. at 18.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 19.
268
269
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voter intimidation, due to the possibility that votes could be traced
back to the people who had cast them.278
One of the reports issued by the Committee on Elections,
submitted by Representative Manning, agreed that numbering
ballots violated the state constitution, but nevertheless rested its
analysis on the “broader foundation[]” that the numbered ballots
were “incompatible with an honest, fair, and free election” because
they had been numbered “for a corrupt and dishonest purpose.”279
That report concluded that certain judges had decided to number
ballots to intimidate workers by making their votes identifiable.280
The other report—misleadingly labeled “Views of a Minority,”281
even though it was signed by the same number of members—argued
that the statute’s validity under the state constitution was
irrelevant.282 This report, signed by Representative Keifer,
explained that a state legislature receives its authority to regulate
congressional elections from the Elections Clause, not the state
constitution.283 The report elaborated:
The State legislature is not . . . controlled by the State
constitution, in its action in regard to the manner of
holding Federal elections. In case of a conflict between
the act of a legislature and the constitution of the State
in matters purely of a Federal character, the act of the
legislature will prevail, provided it is not in conflict with
the Constitution of the United States.284

278 Id. at 20 (“[The ballot numbering] was done to prevent a fair election, and to give the
employers of workingmen an opportunity to still further intimidate them by preserving a
record of how the men voted whose means of life depended upon the good-will of those who
employed them . . . .”).
279 Id. at 18.
280 Id. at 20.
281 Id. at 33 (minority report submitted by Rep. Keifer).
282 Id. at 58 (“Your committee need not . . . consider whether this law is unconstitutional or
not . . . .”).
283 Id. (“The legislature of a State does not acquire its right or power to make a law
regulating the manner of holding elections for Representatives in Congress from . . . the
constitution of the State, but this right and power is derived exclusively from [the Elections
Clause].”).
284 Id.
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The House recommitted the matter to the Committee without
voting on the competing reports’ resolutions.285 This precedent is of
little value in determining the House’s attitude toward the
independent state legislature doctrine for several reasons. First, the
Committee on Elections issued two reports. The Keifer report,
which embraced the doctrine, was signed by as many members as
the Manning report, which did not discuss it.286 Second, the
Manning report rested its conclusion on concerns about voter
intimidation, rather than the unconstitutionality of the state ballotmarking law.287 It neither considered nor rejected the independent
state legislature doctrine, but rather ignored it. Finally—and most
importantly—since the House apparently never voted on the
matter, it is impossible to know which report it would have adopted.
B. THE TIMING OF ELECTIONS

1. West Virginia (1872). The House expressly relied upon the
independent state legislature doctrine in resolving a dispute over
the timing of the 1872 elections for West Virginia’s first and second
congressional districts.288 State law specified that the “general
election” for all state and local offices “shall be held on the fourth
Thursday of October” each year.289 Representatives to Congress
were to be chosen “[a]t the said elections” every other year.290 A state
constitutional convention proposed a new constitution specifying
that any state laws in force that were “not repugnant” to it would
remain in effect upon ratification, unless the legislature amended
or repealed them.291 The convention also adopted a schedule
requiring that an election be held in late August 1872 to allow voters
to ratify both the new constitution and the schedule itself.292 The
10 CONG. REC. 4622 (1880).
Compare H.R. REP. NO. 46-1791, at 32 (Manning report), with id. at 79 (Keifer report).
287 Id. at 19–20 (Manning report).
288 See WEST VIRGINIA CONTESTED ELECTIONS, H.R. REP. NO. 43-7, at 1 (1874) (majority
report), resolutions proposed by committee report rejected, 2 CONG. REC. 962–63 (1874); see
also id. at 19–20 (minority report of Rep. Hazelton), resolutions proposed by minority report
adopted, 2 CONG. REC. 963–64 (1874).
289 H.R. REP. NO. 43-7, at 1 (majority report) (citing W. VA. CODE § 3(1)).
290 Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 3(2)).
291 Id. at 2 (citing W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 36).
292 Id. at 1–2.
285
286
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schedule further specified that elections would also be held at that
time for state and local offices under the new constitution.293
The proposed schedule’s effect on congressional elections was
unclear, so the state held two elections: one in August, concurrently
with the ratification vote, and another in October, consistent with
state law.294 The voters ratified the new state constitution in the
August election.295 In addition, a total of approximately 26,300 votes
were cast in the congressional election in the first district, with John
J. Davis prevailing, and over 4,000 in the second district, with J.M.
Hagans prevailing.296 In the October congressional election, only
4,100 votes were cast in the first district, with Benjamin Wilson
prevailing, but nearly 6,000 votes were cast in the second district,
with B.F. Martin prevailing.297 The governor issued certificates of
election to all four men,298 and an election contest was filed with the
House to decide which results were valid.299
The House referred the matter to the Committee on Elections.300
The majority on the Committee concluded that neither the state
constitution nor the accompanying schedule addressed the timing
of congressional elections.301 The legislature, however, had
“implicitly obeyed the requirement” of the Elections Clause by
enacting a statute “prescrib[ing]” a “day certain” for electing
Representatives to the House: the fourth Thursday in October.302
Since that law remained in effect under the new constitution, the
majority recommended that Congress seat Wilson and Martin based
on the results of the October election.303

Id. at 1.
Id. at 1–2.
295 Id. at 1.
296 Id. at 2.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 1.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 4 (describing how “[t]he new constitution did not in terms . . . [or] by implication,
remove the election of Representatives in Congress . . . from the day fixed” by state law, which
was in October); id. at 8 (noting that the Committee did not “think that [the schedule]
authorized or undertook to authorize the election of Representatives in Congress” during the
August ratification election).
302 Id. at 3.
303 Id. at 9.
293
294
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Representative Speer drafted a minority report on behalf of two
other committee members, concurring in the majority’s
conclusions.304 Centered around the independent state legislature
doctrine, the concurring report began by recognizing that a state
legislature derives its power to hold and regulate congressional
elections “not from the constitution of the State, but from the
Constitution of the United States.”305 The Elections Clause
“expressly committed to the legislature of each State the power to
prescribe the time of holding congressional elections, subject only in
its exercise to the higher power of Congress.”306 Consequently,
“there was no power in the State, or out of it, competent to change
the time” set by the legislature for congressional elections, “except
Congress and the legislature itself.”307 Speer went on to emphasize
that the state constitutional convention “had no authority at all to
name a day for congressional elections,” much less one that differed
from that set by the legislature.308
Speer agreed with the majority that the draft constitution did not
purport to change the time for holding congressional elections.309 He
went on to declare that any attempt to set a new date for
congressional elections in the state constitution would have been
“unauthorized and void.”310 He explained:
The State constitution had not given to the legislature
the power to say when Congressmen shall be elected,
(for it did not have [such power] to give,) [sic] and
neither State constitution nor State convention could
take it away. The legislature derived it from the

Id. at 11 (minority report of Rep. Speer).
Id. at 13.
306 Id. at 11; see also id. at 13 (“The legislature alone, under the Constitution of the United
States, was competent to prescribe the time [of congressional elections] . . . .”).
307 Id. at 12.
308 Id.; see also id. at 13 (arguing that, because the legislature’s authority to schedule
congressional elections came from the U.S. Constitution, “it was beyond the reach of the State
convention . . . to limit, modify, or control in any way the exercise of this power”).
309 Id. at 16 (“The convention did not touch the subject of congressional elections, but left it
just where the legislature had placed it.”).
310 Id.
304
305
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supreme law of the land, the Constitution of the United
States, and in its exercise it knew but one master.311
Speer concluded that state law required congressional elections to
be held on the fourth Tuesday in October.312
Representative Hazelton issued another minority report which
was more in the nature of a dissent, concluding that only the August
election was legitimate.313 It interpreted state law to require that
congressional elections be held simultaneously with the general
election for state and local offices.314 Hazelton’s minority report
reasoned that, since no general election had been held in late
October, state law did not allow congressional elections to occur at
that time.315 Conversely, since a general election for state and local
offices had been held in August simultaneously with the ratification
vote, state law required congressional elections to be held then, as
well.316 The report emphasized that, even under this approach, it
was still the institutional legislature itself that had “prescribed” the
time of the congressional election, as required by the Elections
Clause under the independent state legislature doctrine.317
When the House debated the conflicting reports, numerous
representatives—supporting candidates on both sides of the
election contest—expressly embraced the independent state
legislature doctrine.318 For example, Representative Lamar
Id. at 17.
Id. at 12–13.
313 Id. at 19–20 (minority report of Rep. Hazelton), resolutions proposed by minority report
adopted, 2 CONG. REC. 963–64 (1874).
314 Id. at 20 (concluding that, under state law, “[t]he election of Representatives in Congress
was hinged on to the State election. It was a mere incident of the State election.”).
315 Id.
316 Id. at 21 (“It being, we think, clearly the purpose of the legislature that Representatives
in Congress should be elected at the general election, it follows that when the occasion was
changed, transplanted, the election of Representatives in Congress went with it.”).
317 Id. at 23 (“Even if we concede that the word ‘prescribe’ [in the Elections Clause] shall
have here its narrowest and most technical signification, there seems to us to have been a
sufficient prescription of the time [by the legislature].”).
318 See, e.g., 2 CONG. REC. 878 (1874) (statement of Rep. Todd) (explaining that, while the
state constitution’s provisions concerning the timing of elections for state and local offices
were binding on the legislature, the Elections Clause designated the legislature “as the one
competent authority, specifically to fix and prescribe a time, place, and manner for the
election of Representatives in Congress”); id. at 887 (statement of Rep. Thomas) (arguing that
311
312
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declared that, “in requiring the Legislature to prescribe the time of
holding the congressional election[,] [the Elections Clause] meant to
exclude the idea that a [state constitutional] convention should be
invested with that important power.”319 Representative Todd
elaborated:
The law providing for and regulating the election of
State officers has its source in the State constitution;
that for the election of congressional Representatives in
the Constitution of the United States. Each is
imperative and absolute within its own sphere, and may
and do have entire freedom of action, without jostling or
infringing on each other . . . .320
These representatives argued that only the institutional legislature
itself—rather than the state’s constitutional convention or even the
state constitution—could set the “time” of congressional elections.321
Due to the general consensus that the Elections Clause allowed
only the legislature—rather than the state constitutional
convention or the state constitution—to set a date for congressional
elections, the contest turned on a question of statutory
a state constitutional convention lacks authority to “repeal or alter . . . a statute of this kind
providing, in obedience to the national Constitution, for the election of Representatives in
Congress”); id. at 934 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (arguing that, if the state constitutional
convention had intended to move congressional elections to August, it “would not be a
compliance with the mandate of the Federal Constitution, that the legislative power shall
prescribe the time for such election”); see also id. at 884 (statement of Rep. Hyde) (explaining
that “a constitutional convention, with its powers limited by a former constitution and by the
act creating it, . . . is not a Legislature within the meaning of [the Elections Clause],” and
therefore cannot regulate congressional elections); id. at 958 (statement of Rep. Butler)
(noting that determining when congressional elections would be held was within the
“constitutional province” of the legislature, rather than a constitutional convention).
319 Id. at 846 (statement of Rep. Lamar).
320 Id. at 878 (statement of Rep. Todd).
321 Id. at 844 (statement of Rep. Lamar); see also id. at 889 (statement of Rep. Harrison)
(explaining that, to find the August congressional election valid, the House must “find some
warrant for it in an act of the Legislature,” because of the Elections Clause); id. at 848
(statement of Rep. Danford) (emphasizing that the state legislature complied with the
Elections Clause by enacting statutes governing the time and manner of congressional
elections); id. at 932 (statement of Rep. Crossland) (“The Legislature of the State is the only
body in the State that is authorized by the Constitution to prescribe the times and places for
holding congressional elections . . . .”); accord id. at 933–34 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
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interpretation. The House, adopting Hazelton’s minority view,
ultimately concluded that the August election was valid and voted
134–82–70 to seat Davis and 115–75–97 to seat Hagans.322
2. Iowa (1878). The House relied on the independent state
legislature doctrine again only a few years later to resolve a similar
dispute concerning two districts’ results in Iowa’s 1878
congressional elections.323 A federal law that Congress enacted in
1872, which entered into effect in 1876, generally required states to
hold congressional elections in November.324 The Governor of Iowa,
however, believed the state fell within an exception in the statute
and held the election in October instead.325 Approximately 30,000
votes were cast in each of the two contested districts, with Cyrus C.
Carpenter and William F. Sapp receiving the most votes in their
respective races.326 Residents of several towns within those districts
disagreed with the governor’s interpretation of federal law and
believed that congressional elections had to be held in November.327
They held their own private elections, with no involvement from any
“regularly-appointed” governmental officials besides one town
clerk.328 A few hundred votes were cast between the two districts,
and J.C. Holmes and John J. Wilson prevailed.329
The majority of the House Committee on Elections began by
determining when Iowa law required elections be held.330 It relied
solely on state law, expressly ignoring state constitutional
provisions governing the timing of congressional elections.331 The
Committee explained that the Elections Clause gives state
legislatures the power to determine the “time” of congressional
elections, and a state constitution “cannot take this power from the
Id. at 963–64.
IOWA CONTESTED ELECTIONS CASES, H.R. REP. NO. 46-19, at 1–18 (1880) (majority
report), resolutions proposed by committee report adopted, 11 CONG. REC. 1074 (1881).
324 Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, §§ 3–4, 17 Stat. 28, 28–29; see also Michael T. Morley,
Postponing Federal Elections Due to Election Emergencies, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE
179, 198–203 (2020) (discussing the statute’s legislative history).
325 H.R. REP. NO. 46-19, at 8.
326 Id. at 1–2, 4, 7.
327 Id. at 3–5.
328 Id. at 4–6.
329 Id. at 5–7.
330 Id. at 17–18.
331 Id. at 18.
322
323
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legislature of a State . . . .”332 Consequently, the Committee
“disregard[ed] altogether the provision for the election of members
of Congress found in . . . the constitution of Iowa.”333 Regardless of
the intent underlying the state constitution, “the time of electing
members of Congress cannot be prescribed by the constitution of a
State.”334 The Committee agreed with the governor’s conclusion that
state law required congressional elections to be held in October and
that federal law did not mandate a different date.335 The House
seated Sapp and Carpenter in accordance with the Committee’s
recommendation by voice vote without debate.336
C. SELECTING U.S. SENATORS

During the nineteenth century, the U.S. Senate similarly applied
the independent state legislature doctrine to the other type of
congressional “election” mandated by the Constitution at the time:
direct appointment of U.S. Senators by state legislatures.337 The
Elections Clause’s grant of authority to state legislatures to
determine the time, place, and manner of congressional elections
extended to a legislature’s own selection of U.S. Senators.338 Thus,
the Constitution specifically empowered the legislature itself—
rather than the state as a whole—to both elect the state’s U.S.
Senators and determine the manner in which it would go about such
elections. The state constitution could not limit the substantive
scope of that authority.
In 1887, one of West Virginia’s seats in the U.S. Senate became
vacant because the legislature had not agreed upon a new senator
by the time the sitting senator’s term expired.339 The governor
appointed Daniel B. Lucas to serve as senator until the legislature

Id. at 9.
Id. at 18.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 17–18.
336 11 CONG. REC. 1074 (1881).
337 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. The Seventeenth Amendment, allowing the people to elect
U.S. Senators, was not adopted until the early twentieth century. Id. amend. XVII.
338 Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
339 S. REP. NO. 50-1, at 2 (1887), resolutions proposed by committee report adopted without
debate, 19 CONG. REC. 54 (1887).
332
333
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appointed a replacement.340 The governor separately called a special
session of the legislature to deal with eleven specified issues, none
of which included filling the U.S. Senate seat.341 The West Virginia
Constitution specified that, when the governor convenes a special
session of the legislature, “it shall enter upon no business, except
that stated in the proclamation by which it was called together.”342
During the special session, the legislature nevertheless voted to
elect Charles J. Faulkner to the seat.343
Even though the West Virginia legislature’s election of Faulkner
during a special session violated the state constitution, the Senate
Committee on Privileges and Elections sided with him.344 The
Committee concluded the state constitution’s requirement that
special legislative sessions adhere to the issues identified in the
governor’s proclamation applied only to “business to be transacted
under authority of the State constitution.”345 State constitutional
restrictions did not apply to the legislature’s “performance of duties
imposed upon it by the supreme authority of the Constitution of the
United States.”346 The Senate unanimously adopted the resolutions
proposed by the Committee without debate.347
New Jersey’s attempted appointment of John Stockton to the
U.S. Senate in 1865 provides even stronger support for the
independent state legislature doctrine because senators on both

19 CONG. REC. 1 (1887) (statement of President Pro Tempore).
Id.
342 W. VA. CONST. of 1872, art. VII, § 7.
343 19 CONG. REC. 1 (1887).
344 S. REP. NO. 50-1, at 3–4.
345 Id. at 3.
346 Id. at 3–4.
347 19 CONG. REC. 54 (1887). Oregon’s attempts to elect U.S. Senators by popular vote prior
to the Seventeenth Amendment suggest that states were similarly unable to limit the
authority that the U.S. Constitution granted to legislatures over senatorial appointments.
The Oregon legislature enacted a law in 1908 requiring its members to pledge to vote to
appoint whichever U.S. Senate candidate won the state’s senate preference primary. Muller,
supra note 29, at 723 (quoting ALLEN H. EATON, THE OREGON SYSTEM: THE STORY OF DIRECT
LEGISLATION IN OREGON 169 n.22 (1912)). Contemporaneous commentary called the measure
“unconstitutional.” Id. (quoting EATON, supra at 96). Although no lawsuit was ever brought,
some legislators simply ignored the law in 1913 by voting for a U.S. Senate candidate who
did not win the popular vote. Id. at 724.
340
341
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sides of the dispute relied upon it.348 Both the New Jersey
Constitution and a New Jersey statute required the two chambers
of the state’s legislature to meet together in joint session to appoint
U.S. Senators.349 While sitting in joint session, the legislature
adopted a rule providing that a plurality of votes would be sufficient
to select a senator.350 John P. Stockton won a plurality with forty
out of eighty-one votes cast; the next highest candidate had only
thirty-seven votes.351 An election contest was filed, contesting the
validity of Stockton’s election on the grounds that he had not
received a majority of votes in the joint session.352
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s report began by expressly
endorsing the independent state legislature doctrine. It declared,
“The constitution of New Jersey does not prescribe the manner of
choosing United States senators; as, indeed, it could not, the
Constitution of the United States having vested that power, in the
absence of any law of Congress, exclusively in the
legislature . . . .”353 The Committee then explained that, while the
legislature had enacted a law requiring it to select senators in joint
session, that statute did “not prescribe any rules for the government
of [that] joint meeting.”354 The Committee concluded that, because
the “laws of New Jersey . . . authorize a joint meeting of the two
houses of the legislature to appoint a senator,” the legislature had
implicitly authorized that joint meeting to decide for itself whether
to elect senators by a plurality vote.355 Consequently, the Committee
recommended seating Stockton.356
At the end of the report, the Committee noted an alternate
“plausib[le]” basis for its ruling: the joint session had power to
determine its own rules because the New Jersey constitution
See generally S. REP. NO. 39-4 (1866), resolution proposed by committee report adopted,
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1601–02 (1866), reconsideration granted and resolution
rejected, id. at 1677, 1679.
349 Id. at 1; accord id. at 5–7 (reprinting Letter from N.J. Sen. W.W. Ware et al., to the U.S.
Senate (Mar. 20, 1865)).
350 Id. at 2.
351 Id.
352 Id. at 1.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Id. at 3.
356 Id. at 4.
348
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recognized it as the “legislature” for purposes of the Elections
Clause.357 The Committee expressly declined to accept that
rationale, however.358 Moreover, this reasoning does not imply that
a state constitution may designate some entity outside of, and
unrelated to, the institutional legislature as the “Legislature” for
purposes of the Elections Clause. Elsewhere, the report emphasizes,
“The right to choose United States senators in a joint meeting of the
two houses which compose the legislature of a State has been too
long and too frequently exercised to be now brought in question.
This has been the manner of election in some States from the
beginning . . . .”359 Thus, this proposed alternate rationale—which
the Committee itself did not even adopt—may be construed as
recognizing that a state constitution has some latitude in specifying
which configuration of an institutional state legislature’s chambers
qualifies as the “legislature” for purposes of the U.S. Constitution.
Regardless, the Committee recognized that a state constitution
cannot impose substantive constraints upon whatever entity
qualifies as the legislature concerning the manner of selecting U.S.
Senators.360
The precedential value of the Stockton report is muddied by its
subsequent history. Initially, the Senate voted twenty-two to
twenty-one to adopt the report and seat Stockton.361 A few days
later, though, a senator objected that the vote was invalid because
Stockton himself had participated.362 The Senate voted again on the
matter, rejecting Stockton by a vote of twenty to twenty-three.363
Even Stockton’s opponents, however, framed their arguments in
terms of the independent state legislature doctrine. Senator
Sherman, for example, declared that while the Elections Clause
allows a legislature to “prescribe a plurality rule in the election of a
Senator, a joint convention of the Legislature in the exercise of the
law cannot do it.”364 Most senators who participated in the debates
Id.
Id.
359 Id. at 3.
360 See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
361 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1602 (1866).
362 Id. at 1635 (statement of Sen. Sumner).
363 Id. at 1677, 1679.
364 Id. at 1677 (statement of Sen. Sherman); see also id. at 1668 (statement of Sen. Howard)
(emphasizing that the Elections Clause delegates power to determine the manner of Senate
357
358

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol55/iss1/2

64

Morley: The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, an

2020] INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE

65

generally agreed that the Elections Clause allowed only the
“Legislature” to determine the manner in which Senators would be
appointed; they differed primarily on whether a joint session of the
New Jersey Legislature could qualify as such.365
D. REFORMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

The nineteenth century Senate also expressed support for the
independent state legislature doctrine outside the context of
election contests. In 1874, the U.S. Senate Committee on Privileges
and Elections considered a potential constitutional amendment to
require states to elect their presidential electors from electoral
districts.366 The report explained that state legislatures already
could adopt this system, despite any restrictions in their state
constitutions.367 It stated that, under the Presidential Electors
Clause, “[t]he appointment of these electors is thus placed
absolutely and wholly with the legislatures of the several states.”368
This authority “cannot be taken from them or modified by their
State constitutions any more than can their power to elect Senators
of the United States.”369 The Committee further emphasized,
“Whatever provisions may be made by statute, or by the State
constitution, to choose electors by the people, there is no doubt of
the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it
can neither be taken away nor abdicated.”370 The U.S. Supreme
Court quoted the report approvingly in support of the independent
state legislature doctrine in its 1892 ruling in McPherson v.
Blacker.371

elections to the institutional legislature, which is a different entity from the chambers of the
legislature sitting in joint session).
365 See id. at 1668–79.
366 S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 2 (1874) (outlining the proposed amendment).
367 See id. at 9.
368 Id.
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 146 U.S. 1, 34–35 (1892).
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E. LIMITS OF THE DOCTRINE: DISPUTES OVER VOTER
QUALIFICATIONS

Congressional election contests throughout the nineteenth
century also confirm one of the major limitations of the independent
state legislature doctrine: state constitutions may limit a
legislature’s authority over voter qualifications for congressional
elections.372 As explained earlier, the independent state legislature
doctrine arises for congressional elections from the Elections
Clause,373 which allows the “Legislature” of each state to determine
their “Times, Places and Manner.”374 Separate constitutional
provisions—the Voter Qualifications Clause375 and the Seventeenth
Amendment376—specify that anyone entitled to vote for the more
populous branch of the state legislature is also eligible to vote in
congressional elections.
Thus, the Elections Clause does not empower either Congress or
state legislatures to directly set the qualifications that voters must
possess to be eligible to vote in congressional elections.377 Rather,
the U.S. Constitution ties eligibility to vote in congressional
elections to voting eligibility for state legislative races.378 Because
the U.S. Constitution does not grant the legislature exclusive
authority to set voter qualifications in state legislative elections, the
matter is left to the inherent control of the states themselves, as
entities.379 Consequently, state constitutions may establish voter
qualifications for state legislative elections (and, by extension,
See supra note 62.
See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
374 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
375 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite
for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”).
376 Id. amend. XVII.
377 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2013) (holding that
authority to “[p]rescrib[e] voter qualifications” is neither “‘conferred upon the national
government’ by the Elections Clause,” nor “plac[ed] . . . within the unfettered discretion of
state legislatures” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton)); see also
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 210 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (declaring that the Constitution does not “lend[] itself to the view that voting
qualifications in federal elections are to be set by Congress”).
378 See supra notes 375–376 and accompanying text.
379 See Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 17 (stating that neither the federal nor state
franchise are “within the unfettered discretion of state legislatures”).
372
373
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congressional elections), and any state laws that conflict with such
provisions are invalid and unenforceable.380
During the nineteenth century, the chambers of Congress
observed this limitation on the independent state legislature
doctrine. For example, in Johnston v. Stokes, the House Elections
Committee concluded that South Carolina’s voter registration
statute violated the state constitution by impermissibly adding new
voter qualifications.381 Agreeing with this conclusion, the House
concluded that the election was invalid and refused to seat any of
the candidates.382
Curtin v. Yocum was a contest in which the House ultimately
adopted the Election Committee’s minority report, which recognized
and enforced this restriction on the independent state legislature
doctrine.383 The Pennsylvania Constitution authorized the
legislature to enact voter registration laws, but provided that “no
elector shall be deprived of the privilege of voting by reason of his
name not being registered.”384 Pennsylvania law provided that an
unregistered person could still vote if he presented affidavits from
both the voter himself and another registered voter attesting to his
eligibility.385 A person who neither registered nor provided the
required affidavits could not vote.
Despite this statute, election officials allowed several hundred
people who neither registered nor provided the statutorily required
affidavits to vote.386 The Election Committee’s majority report
concluded that, because election officials had accepted votes that
were invalid under the state constitution and state law, the election

See supra note 62.
THOMAS B. JOHNSTON V. J. WILLIAM STOKES, H.R. REP. NO. 54-1229, at 14 (1896)
(majority report) (“[T]he committee agree[s] that a part of the law is unconstitutional, being
in violation of the constitution of the State of South Carolina.”), resolution proposed by
committee report amended and adopted, 28 CONG. REC. 5952 (1896); id. at 14 (statement of
Rep. McCall, concurring) (“This provision is clearly repugnant to the constitution of South
Carolina, which under the pretense of regulating suffrage imposes a new qualification upon
it, and is therefore unconstitutional.”).
382 28 CONG. REC. 5952 (1896).
383 See CURTIN VS. YOCUM, H.R. REP. NO. 46-345, at 11–19 (1880) (submitting views of the
minority), resolution proposed by minority report adopted, 10 CONG. REC. 3250–51 (1880).
384 Id. at 2 (majority report).
385 Id. at 4.
386 Id. at 2.
380
381
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results had to be discarded.387 During floor debates, the majority
report’s primary proponent, Representative Beltzhoover, explained
that the majority did not seek to act contrary to the state
constitution by disenfranchising voters for failing to register.388
Rather, the majority had concluded that the challenged votes were
invalid because the unregistered voters had failed to provide the
affidavits that state law permitted as an alternative to
registration.389
The minority, in contrast, argued that the state constitution
imposed “a limitation on the power of the legislature of the State.”390
Prohibiting people from voting because they were unregistered
would violate the state constitution, even though state law allowed
such voters to establish their eligibility through other means.391 To
avoid this constitutional infirmity, the minority construed state law
as requiring election officials to count all votes except those from
people who had been specifically asked to provide the required proof
of eligibility and failed to do so.392
The minority report’s author, Representative Calkins, explained
during the floor debate that refusing to count the votes of people
who had neither registered nor provided affidavits confirming their
eligibility treated those requirements as voter qualifications.393 The
state legislature was prohibited, however, from adopting new voter
qualifications beyond those set forth in the state constitution.394
Calkins explained, “[W]herever a constitution declares the
qualifications of electors, and a registry law add[s] additional tests
to those qualifications, the registry law [is] null and void . . . .”395
Id. at 10 (concluding that “the true result of the election” was unknown and
recommending “that the election be declared void”).
388 10 CONG. REC. 3145–46 (1880) (statement of Rep. Beltzhoover).
389 Id.
390 H.R. REP. NO. 46-345, at 13 (views of the minority).
391 Id. at 14 (explaining that, so far as state law “restricts [a person’s] right to vote, if he is
otherwise qualified, [it] is an additional test of his right to vote, [and] is repugnant to that
sacred privilege reserved to each citizen . . . in the very words of the constitution”).
392 Id. at 15 (“[I]f he is allowed to vote without being required to file the affidavits, and is
otherwise qualified, his vote is not an illegal one.”).
393 10 CONG. REC. 3184 (1880) (statement of Rep. Calkins).
394 Id. (“[T]he very purpose of this constitutional provision . . . was to prevent the
Legislature . . . [from] making a registry law that would be an additional test to the
qualifications of the voter.”).
395 Id.
387
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Representative Stevenson echoed these sentiments.396 He
reaffirmed “that it is the province of the Legislature to indicate the
manner in which the voter is to exercise his privilege. The time,
manner, and place fall within the legislative prerogative.”397 Voter
qualifications fell outside the scope of that power, however, and
Stevenson wished to ensure that “the rights of the legally qualified
elector[s] shall not be imperiled.”398 Following extensive debates,
the House ultimately adopted the minority report.399 Thus, the
distinction between a state’s authority over voter qualifications and
the legislature’s power over the time, place, and manner of
congressional elections was recognized and enforced.
In short, throughout the nineteenth century, whenever the
independent state legislature doctrine was raised in an election
contest before a chamber of Congress, it was consistently embraced
and applied.

V. THE DOCTRINE IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
The U.S. Supreme Court’s attitude toward the independent state
legislature doctrine has vacillated over the past century and a
quarter. For every case embracing the doctrine throughout that
time, another has questioned or even rejected it. This Part traces
the doctrine’s history before the Court. Though some tension exists
among the Court’s early cases, they can reasonably be read together
as concluding that a state constitution cannot impose substantive
limits on the scope of the state legislature’s authority to regulate
the time, place, and manner of federal elections, but the legislature
must follow the lawmaking process set forth in the state constitution
when doing so. In 2015, however, a bare majority of the Court flatly
rejected all aspects of the doctrine, albeit arguably in dicta, with
almost no attention to its rich history of application throughout the
nineteenth century. This Part concludes by analyzing various ways
in which the doctrine could be reincorporated into modern
constitutional law.

Id. at 3179–81 (statement of Rep. Stevenson).
Id. at 3180.
398 Id.
399 Id. at 3250–51.
396
397
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A. DEVELOPING A PROCEDURE/SUBSTANCE DICHOTOMY: THE
EARLY YEARS

The Court first discussed the independent state legislature
doctrine in its 1892 ruling in McPherson v. Blacker, which
enthusiastically endorsed it, although primarily in dicta.400 The
plaintiffs in McPherson challenged the constitutionality of a
Michigan law requiring presidential electors to be elected by
district.401 The opinion begins by recognizing that the U.S.
Constitution “frequently refers to the State as a political
community.”402 When acting under such provisions, the state must
exercise its “legislative power under state constitutions as they
exist.”403 The Presidential Electors Clause, in contrast, provides
that a state shall select its presidential electors “in such manner as
the legislature thereof may direct.”404 That express delegation of
authority specifically to the legislature “operat[es] as a limitation
upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the
legislative power . . . .”405 In other words, a state may not restrict
the authority that its legislature receives from the Presidential
Electors Clause.
The Court went on to emphasize that the Presidential Electors
Clause grants the legislature “plenary authority to direct the
manner of [its electors’] appointment.”406 A legislature is not
required to use any particular method of appointing electors “in the
absence of an amendment to the [U.S.] Constitution.”407 It may
therefore choose to appoint electors based on the results of separate
elections held within each congressional district.408
146 U.S. 1, 34–35 (1892).
Id. at 24–25.
402 Id. at 25.
403 Id.
404 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2); see also id. at 27 (declaring that the
Constitution “leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method” of choosing
electors).
405 Id. at 25.
406 Id.; see also id. at 35 (“[T]he practical construction of the clause has conceded plenary
power to the state legislatures in the matter of the appointment of electors.”).
407 Id. at 29.
408 See id. at 25–26 (“[I]t is difficult to perceive why, if the legislature prescribes as a method
of appointment choice by vote, it must necessarily be by general ticket and not by districts.
400
401
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The Court also quoted approvingly from a report that the Senate
Committee on Privileges and Elections issued in 1874.409 The report
accompanied a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that
would have required states to create electoral districts and appoint
presidential electors based on whichever candidate won a majority
of the popular vote in each district.410 As discussed earlier,411 the
Committee report stated that, under the Presidential Electors
Clause:
[t]he appointment of these electors is thus placed
absolutely and wholly with the legislatures of the
several States. . . . This power is conferred upon the
legislatures of the States by the Constitution of the
United States, and cannot be taken from them or
modified by their State constitutions any more than can
their power to elect Senators of the United States.
Whatever provisions may be made by statute, or by the
state constitution, to choose electors by the people, there
is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the
power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor
abdicated.412
Thus, the Court endorsed the notion that a state constitution
could not limit the scope of a legislature’s authority to regulate
presidential elections under the Presidential Electors Clause. It
concluded that the Michigan legislature was free to choose
presidential electors based on the popular vote within each
district.413
The Court’s next major rulings touching on the doctrine, issued
in the early twentieth century, suggest that the Court may have
harbored some degree of skepticism towards it; nevertheless, they
remain fully consistent with the doctrine. In the 1916 case Ohio ex

In other words, the act of appointment is none the less the act of the State in its entirety
because arrived at by districts . . . .”).
409 Id. at 34–35 (citing S. REP. NO. 43-395 (1874)).
410 Id. at 34.
411 See supra Section IV.D.
412 McPherson, 146 U.S. at 34–35 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395 (1874)).
413 See id. at 42.
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rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, the Ohio Constitution allowed the public to
vote to nullify any law enacted by the institutional state
legislature.414 Using this referendum process, the people rejected a
state law adopting new congressional districts.415 A group of voters
had sought a writ of mandamus from the state supreme court to
compel election officials to hold elections based on those rejected
maps.416 They argued that, since the Elections Clause granted
power to regulate congressional elections specifically to the
institutional state legislature, a referendum could not be used to
reject or displace state election laws.417
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument.418 It began by
noting that a recently enacted federal statute allowed states to
incorporate a public referendum into the process for creating
congressional districts if the state constitution or state law treated
the referendum procedure “as part of the [state’s] legislative
power.”419 The Court then mentioned the plaintiffs’ argument that,
under the Elections Clause, the term “legislature” cannot include a
referendum.420 The Court did not address the merits of the
plaintiffs’ Elections Clause claim, however, but rather transmuted
it into an argument under the Guarantee Clause.421 The Court
declared:
[The plaintiffs’ argument] must rest upon the
assumption that to include the referendum in the scope
of the legislative power is to introduce a virus which
destroys that power, which in effect annihilates
representative government and causes a State where

414 241 U.S. 565, 566 (1916) (noting that the state constitution granted the people “a
right . . . by way of referendum to approve or disapprove” of any state statute).
415 Id.
416 Id. at 566–67.
417 Id. at 567.
418 Id. at 569.
419 Id. at 568.
420 Id. at 569.
421 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol55/iss1/2

72

Morley: The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, an

2020] INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE

73

such condition exists to be not republican in form in
violation of the guarantee of the Constitution.422
Thus, the Court never addressed the meaning of the term
“legislature” as used in the Elections Clause. Rather, it replaced
that term with the phrase “legislative power,” and then considered
whether including a referendum process as part of a state’s
“legislative power” deprives that state of a republican form of
government. The Court declined to reach the merits of that
alternate constitutional issue on the grounds that Guarantee
Clause claims are non-justiciable.423
Subsequent cases and commentators have read Davis much more
broadly than its actual holding warrants.424 First, although Davis is
often characterized as an Elections Clause case, the Court did not
address the Elections Clause question, but rather recharacterized it
as a nonjusticiable Guarantee Clause issue.425 Second, the Court
simply held that a state could incorporate a public referendum into
its legislative process to allow voters to disapprove a redistricting
scheme enacted by the institutional legislature.426 The referendum
process that Davis upheld was comparable to a gubernatorial veto.
Davis does not state, however, that a referendum or other such
process may be used to affirmatively adopt congressional districts
or other rules for congressional elections.427
Third, Davis does not suggest that a state may completely
exclude its institutional legislature from either participating in the
congressional redistricting process or regulating congressional
elections more broadly. Finally, although Davis allows a state to
determine the entities or processes that comprise its “legislative
power,”428 the ruling is silent on the separate issue of whether the
state constitution may impose substantive limits on the ability to
Davis, 241 U.S. at 569 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4).
Id. (“[T]he question of whether that guarantee of the Constitution has been disregarded
presents no justiciable controversy . . . .”).
424 See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 805
(2015) (stating that Davis established that the term “‘the Legislature’ . . . encompassed a veto
power lodged in the people”).
425 See Davis, 241 U.S. at 569.
426 See id.
427 Id. at 569–70.
428 Id. at 568.
422
423

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

73

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 [2020], Art. 2

74

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1

regulate federal elections of whatever entities or processes are
included within the state’s “legislative power.” In other words,
Davis allows a state constitution to specify what entity or processes
count as the “Legislature” for purposes of the Elections Clause. It
does not suggest, however, that a state constitution may limit the
scope of the power that the Elections Clause confers upon that
legislature. Thus, Davis is generally consistent with the
independent state legislature doctrine.
Over the next decade, a pair of rulings fully applied the doctrine
in construing Article V’s delegation of power to state legislatures to
ratify proposed constitutional amendments.429 The Court’s 1920
ruling in Hawke v. Smith held—notwithstanding Davis—that a
state constitution could not make a state legislature’s ratification of
a federal constitutional amendment contingent upon a public
referendum.430 In 1917, Congress proposed the Eighteenth
Amendment, establishing Prohibition, and transmitted it to the
states for ratification.431 The Ohio legislature enacted a resolution
ratifying the amendment.432 The state constitution, however,
allowed the people to hold referenda on the legislature’s ratification
of amendments to the U.S. Constitution.433 Some Ohio citizens sued
to enjoin the Ohio Secretary of State from holding a referendum on
the legislature’s ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment.434 They
argued that Article V of the U.S. Constitution granted the power to
ratify federal constitutional amendments solely to the legislature.435
The Court agreed with their argument.436 Invoking the
independent state legislature doctrine, it declared that “the power

429 U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, . . . which, . . . shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several states . . . .”).
430 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
431 S.J. Res. 17, 65th Cong., 40 Stat. 1050 (1917) (proposing the Eighteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution).
432 Hawke, 253 U.S. at 225. For further details concerning Hawke’s procedural history, see
Amar, The People Made Me Do It, supra note 31, at 1076–80.
433 Hawke, 253 U.S. at 225 (discussing a state constitutional provision granting the people
“the legislative power of the referendum” over amendments to the U.S. Constitution).
434 Id. at 224.
435 Id.
436 Id. at 230–31.
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to ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution has its
source in the Federal Constitution.”437 Hawke emphasized that the
term “Legislature” as used in Article V is “not a term of uncertain
meaning when incorporated into the Constitution.”438 It refers to
“the representative body which made the laws of the people.”439 The
Court observed, “The language of the article is plain, and admits of
no doubt in its interpretation. It is not the function of courts or
legislative bodies, national or state, to alter the method which the
Constitution has fixed.”440
The Court went on to note that the term “Legislature” appears to
carry the same meaning wherever it appears in the Constitution.441
Moreover, as originally adopted, the Constitution empowered the
“Legislature” of each state to appoint U.S. Senators.442 If the term
could include referenda by the general public, there would have
been no need to adopt the Seventeenth Amendment443 to allow
popular election of Senators.444
Hawke concluded by distinguishing Davis on the grounds that
ratification of a constitutional amendment is distinct from
enactment of a state law.445 Although the Elections Clause
empowers the state legislature to enact laws regulating federal
elections, Hawke explained, it does not excuse the legislature from
following the legislative procedure set forth in the state
constitution.446 When a state constitution includes a public
referendum “as part of the legislative authority of the state,” as in
Davis, state laws governing federal elections are subject to public

Id. at 230.
Id. at 227.
439 Id.; see also id. (defining “legislature” as a “deliberative assemblage[] representative of
the people”).
440 Id.
441 Id. (“The term is often used in the Constitution with this evident meaning.”); see also id.
at 228 (“There can be no question that the framers of the Constitution clearly understood and
carefully used the terms in which that instrument referred to the action of the legislatures of
the States.”).
442 Id. at 227–28 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3).
443 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
444 Hawke, 253 U.S. at 228 (“The necessity of the amendment to accomplish the purpose of
popular election is shown in the adoption of the amendment.”).
445 Id. at 230–31 (stating that Davis’s holding is “inapposite”).
446 Id. at 231.
437
438
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referenda.447 Ratification of a federal constitutional amendment,
however, is not an exercise of the ordinary state lawmaking
process.448 A state constitution therefore may not impose such
procedural constraints on a legislature’s ability to “express[] . . .
assent or dissent to a proposed amendment to the Constitution.”449
Although Hawke’s ultimate conclusion was correct, it over-read
Davis and endorsed that Court’s erroneous conflation of the term
“Legislature” in the Elections Clause with the broader phrase
“legislative authority of the state.”450 Hawke’s reasoning has also
contributed to the remarkable notion that the term “Legislature”
might mean something different under the Elections Clause (and,
by extension, the Presidential Electors Clause) than throughout the
rest of the Constitution. Nevertheless, Hawke applied the
independent state legislature doctrine, enforcing the constitutional
prerogatives of institutional legislatures under the Article V
Amendments Clause.451
A few years later, in Leser v. Garnett, the Court went even
further in applying the doctrine to the Amendments Clause.452 It
held that the Nineteenth Amendment,453 prohibiting gender
discrimination in voting, had been validly ratified.454 The plaintiffs
argued that several states’ ratifications were invalid because their
state constitutions prohibited their legislatures from ratifying
federal constitutional amendments extending voting rights to
women.455 Rejecting that claim, the Court held that ratification of
amendments to the U.S. Constitution “is a federal function derived
from the Federal Constitution; and it transcends any limitations
Id. at 230–31.
Id. at 229 (“[R]atification by a state of a constitutional amendment is not an act of
legislation within the proper sense of the word.”).
449 Id. at 231.
450 Id. at 230.
451 See also Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (“The referendum provisions
of state constitutions and statutes cannot be applied, consistently with the Constitution of
the United States, in the ratification or rejection of amendments to it.”).
452 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
453 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
454 Leser, 258 U.S. at 137.
455 Id. at 136–37 (discussing the plaintiffs’ argument that the constitutions of several states
that had ratified the Nineteenth Amendment contain “provisions which render inoperative
the alleged ratifications by their legislatures,” and “by reason of these specific provisions the
legislatures were without power to ratify”).
447
448
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sought to be imposed by the people of a State.”456 Thus, Leser
squarely held that a state constitution may not impose substantive
restrictions on the scope of authority that Article V confers directly
on state legislatures to ratify amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
Though the Court’s subsequent rulings focus much more heavily
on Hawke, Leser is actually the more important holding. Hawke
dealt with the definition of “Legislature” in Article V and the
inability of state constitutions to add procedural requirements to
the ratification process.457 Leser confirms that a state constitution
cannot prohibit state legislatures from ratifying certain types of
federal constitutional amendments based on their substantive
content.458 Such reasoning would seem to apply with full force to the
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. Leser strongly
suggests that state constitutions are incapable of imposing
substantive limits or restrictions on the power that the U.S.
Constitution grants state legislatures to pass laws regulating
congressional and presidential elections.
The Court’s ruling a decade later in Smiley v. Holm was largely
agnostic on the independent state legislature doctrine.459 Smiley
explained that, although the Elections Clause grants the legislature
power to enact laws governing federal elections, the legislature’s
“exercise of th[at] authority must be in accordance with the method
which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments.”460 When
a state constitution incorporates a gubernatorial veto into the
lawmaking process, it can be applied to bills concerning

456 Id. at 137. Professor Amar rejects this conclusion. Amar, The People Made Me Do It,
supra note 31, at 1054. He argues that the people of a state should be free to restrict the
legislature’s ability to ratify amendments to the U.S. Constitution, in order to prevent
legislators from engaging in self-dealing by either enlarging their powers or entrenching their
authority at the expense of the people. Id.
457 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227, 230–31 (1920).
458 Leser, 258 U.S. at 137.
459 285 U.S. 355 (1932); accord Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375, 379 (1932) (affirming “[f]or
the reasons stated in the opinion in Smiley v. Holm”); see also State ex rel. Carroll v. Becker,
45 S.W.2d 533, 536–37 (Mo. 1932) (refusing to recognize congressional districts enacted by
the legislature but vetoed by the governor).
460 Smiley, 285 U.S. at 367; see also id. at 368 (holding that the Elections Clause does not
grant the legislature “power to enact laws in any manner other than that in which the
Constitution of the state has provided that laws shall be enacted”).
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congressional elections.461 Smiley distinguished Hawke on the
grounds that ratifying a constitutional amendment is not a
traditional act of lawmaking, and therefore is not subject to the
ordinary legislative process set forth in the state constitution.462
Thus, Smiley reaffirms a legislature’s obligation to follow the
legislative process set forth in its state constitution when regulating
federal elections. The opinion does not address, however, whether a
state constitution may impose substantive limits on the content of
measures the legislature may adopt. Moreover, Smiley hews closely
to the text of the Elections Clause, acknowledging that there is no
doubt as to the “body” to which the term “Legislature” refers,463
rather than more broadly considering the nature or locus of the
state’s “legislative power,” as in Davis.464 In other words, Smiley’s
reasoning does not allow state constitutions to redefine the meaning
of the term “Legislature.”
B. FROM DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS TO
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: THE MODERN CASES

Despite a few allusions to the Elections Clause and Presidential
Electors Clause over the decades that followed,465 the Court did not
revisit the independent state legislature doctrine until seemingly
endorsing it during the dispute over the 2000 presidential election.
The Court’s rulings focused on whether the Presidential Electors
Clause’s delegation of power specifically to state legislatures

Id. at 372–73 (“[T]here is nothing in Article I, section 4, which precludes a State from
providing that legislative action in districting the State for congressional elections shall be
subject to the veto power of the Governor as in other cases of the exercise of the lawmaking
power.”).
462 Id. at 365–66.
463 Id. at 365.
464 Cf. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 567–68 (1916) (holding that the state
constitution made the referendum “part of the legislative power”).
465 See, e.g., Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 225 (1952) (“Neither the language of [the
Presidential Electors Clause], nor that of the Twelfth Amendment forbids a [political] party
to require from candidates in its primary a pledge of political conformity with the aims of the
party.”); see also Grills v. Branigin, 284 F. Supp. 176, 180 (S.D. Ind. 1968) (three-judge court)
(per curiam) (holding that the Elections Clause “clearly does not authorize the defendants, as
members of the Election Board of Indiana, to create congressional districts”), aff’d sub nom.
Branigin v. Duddleston, 391 U.S. 364 (1968) (mem.).
461
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precludes state courts from considering state constitutions when
determining the rules governing presidential elections.
In mid-November 2000, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that
state law allowed certain counties to conduct complete manual
recounts of ballots cast in the presidential election, because their
“sample manual recount[s]” revealed that their automatic
tabulation machines had failed to count some ballots.466 The court
reached this conclusion based on the “plain language” of the
relevant statute, as well as various other state laws governing
recounts.467
It further held that the Secretary of State was required to accept
the results from such manual recounts, even if they were not
available until after the statutory deadline for submitting them,
unless allowing such late updates would preclude either “a
candidate from contesting the certification” or “Florida’s voters from
participating fully in the federal electoral process.”468 The court
based this conclusion on various canons of statutory construction,
numerous state constitutional provisions concerning the right to
vote, and the court’s own precedents.469 It later emphasized that its
interpretation of the Election Code rested at least partly on the fact
that “the right to vote is the preeminent right in the Declaration of
Rights of the Florida Constitution.”470
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions:
(i) whether the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling violated the Due
Process Clause or 3 U.S.C. § 5 by “changing the State’s elector
appointment procedures after election day,” and (ii) whether that
decision violated the Presidential Electors Clause by “chang[ing]
the manner in which the State’s electors are to be selected.”471

466 Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1225, 1229–30 (Fla. 2000)
(holding that “the plain language of [the statute]” allows county canvassing boards “to order
countywide manual recounts”), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531
U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (per curiam).
467 Id. at 1229–30.
468 Id. at 1239. Applying that holding, the court directed the Secretary to accept any
updated vote tallies filed by Sunday, November 26, 2000. Id. at 1240.
469 Id. at 1235–37.
470 Id. at 1239.
471 Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 73 (2000) (per curiam).
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In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded the matter.472
It recognized that, in general, it must “defer[] to a state court’s
interpretation of a state statute.”473 When a legislature enacts a law
that applies to both elections for state office and presidential
elections, however, it “is not acting solely under the authority given
it by the people of the State, but by virtue of a direct grant of
authority made under [the Presidential Electors Clause].”474
Quoting McPherson v. Blacker, the Court stated that the Clause’s
delegation of authority specifically to the legislature prohibits any
attempts by states to “circumscribe the legislative power.”475
Certain parts of the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion, the Court
observed, suggested that the Florida Constitution might limit the
legislature’s authority to regulate presidential elections.476 It
appeared that the Florida Supreme Court had not considered “the
extent to which the Florida Constitution could, consistent with [the
Presidential Electors Clause], ‘circumscribe the legislative
power.’”477 The Court also expressed concern that Congress might
construe the state supreme court’s ruling as a “change in the law”
that would prevent Florida from invoking the Electoral Count Act’s
“safe harbor” to ensure that Congress counts its electoral votes.478
Because the Court had “considerable uncertainty” about the Florida
Supreme Court’s reasoning, it “decline[d] at [that] time to review
the federal questions” on which it had granted certiorari.479 Instead,
the Court remanded the case to give the Florida Supreme Court an
opportunity to clarify its analysis.480 In doing so, the Court
reiterated, “[W]e are unclear as to the extent to which the Florida
Id. at 78.
Id. at 76.
474 Id.
475 Id. (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)).
476 Id. at 77; see also id. at 78 (providing examples from the Florida Supreme Court’s
opinion).
477 Id. (citation omitted).
478 Id. at 77–78 (quoting 3 U.S.C. § 5).
479 Id. at 78 (quoting Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555 (1940)).
480 Id. On remand, the state supreme court reached the same conclusion as in its earlier
ruling, with essentially the same reasoning, except its opinion omitted references to the state
constitution. See generally Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla.
2000).
472
473

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol55/iss1/2

80

Morley: The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, an

2020] INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE

81

Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the
legislature’s authority under [the Presidential Electors Clause].”481
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board appears to be an
endorsement of the independent state legislature doctrine for
several reasons. First, the Court uncritically quoted the language
from McPherson—which had likely been dicta in that opinion—
asserting that states may not “circumscribe” a legislature’s
authority under the Presidential Electors Clause.482 Second, the
Court strongly implied that, since the case involved a state law
enacted under the Presidential Electors Clause, the “general rule”
requiring federal courts to defer to state courts’ interpretations of
state law may not fully apply.483
Third, and perhaps most persuasively, the Court’s decision to
remand the case seems to implicitly assume the validity of the
independent state legislature doctrine. The Florida Supreme
Court’s conclusions about state law were clear. The U.S. Supreme
Court repeatedly emphasized that it was uncertain about whether,
in reaching those conclusions, the Florida Supreme Court had
assumed that a state constitution could limit the state legislature’s
authority over federal elections.484 If the U.S. Supreme Court were
simply bound to accept the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation
of state law, the precise basis for the lower court’s reasoning would
seem to be of limited relevance—particularly in the time-sensitive
context of litigation concerning the outcome of a presidential
election. The most natural implication of the Court’s decision to
remand the case was that it may have been problematic for the state
supreme court to allow its interpretation of state laws concerning
presidential elections to be influenced by the state constitution.
That explanation appears to be most consistent with the Court’s
quotation from McPherson, its suggestion that state laws enacted
under the Presidential Electors Clause differ from state laws
enacted under state constitutions,485 and its repeated emphasis on
Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 78 (citation omitted).
See supra note 475 and accompanying text.
483 See supra note 473–474 and accompanying text.
484 See supra notes 477 & 481 and accompanying text.
485 The Court distinguished laws enacted under the Presidential Electors Clause from laws
passed “solely under the authority given [to the legislature] by the people of the State.” Palm
Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76.
481
482
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whether the Florida Supreme Court had allowed the state
constitution to influence its interpretation of the state laws at issue.
To be sure, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly declined to rule on
the constitutional and statutory issues on which it had granted
certiorari.486 But its decision to remand still seems to have been
based on its interpretation of the Presidential Electors Clause.
In a separate ruling, the Florida Supreme Court ordered a
statewide manual recount of all ballots that had been rejected by
automated tallying machines.487 In Bush v. Gore, a divided U.S.
Supreme Court again reversed.488 It noted that the Presidential
Electors Clause gives the state legislature “plenary” power “to select
the manner for appointing electors.”489 It continued, “When the
state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people,
the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is
fundamental . . . .”490 Accordingly, the Equal Protection Clause
requires states to “avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment” of
voters.491 A statewide manual recount would violate the Equal
Protection Clause because no standards existed for determining
which of the incorrectly marked ballots that automated tallying
machines had rejected should be counted as valid votes.492 Since
there was insufficient time to create uniform standards and conduct
a statewide manual recount by the federal safe-harbor deadline for
selecting electors, the Court ended the recount.493
A three-Justice concurring opinion, authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, placed much
greater emphasis on the independent state legislature doctrine.494
The concurrence noted that, “in ordinary cases, the distribution of
powers among the branches of a State’s government raises no

See supra note 479 and accompanying text.
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98 (2000) (per curiam).
488 531 U.S. at 110–11.
489 Id. at 104.
490 Id.
491 Id. at 105.
492 Id. at 106–07 (contrasting the various methods that counties used to determine whether
particular markings on a ballot should count as a valid vote).
493 Id. at 110–11.
494 Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
486
487
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questions of federal constitutional law.”495 The Presidential Electors
Clause, however, is an “exceptional case[] in which the
Constitution . . . confers a power on a particular branch of a State’s
government”: the state legislature.496 Under the clause, “the text of
the election law itself, and not just its interpretation by the courts
of the States, takes on independent significance.”497 The
Presidential Electors Clause prohibits a state court, under the guise
of statutory interpretation, from “significant[ly] depart[ing]” from
the plain text of the laws enacted by the legislature.498 The Florida
Supreme Court’s order for a statewide recount that would extend
past the federal safe harbor deadline substantially departed from
both past practice as well as the plain meaning of the state election
code, and was therefore invalid.499
Justice Stevens’s dissent largely rejected the doctrine. When the
Presidential Electors Clause confers power on state legislatures, he
reasoned, it “takes them as they come—as creatures born of, and
constrained by, their state constitutions.”500 Justice Stevens quoted
language from McPherson stating that “[w]hat is forbidden or
required to be done by a State . . . is forbidden or required of the
legislative power under state constitutions as they exist.”501 He
concluded that, because the Presidential Electors Clause does not
“free[] the state legislature from the constraints in the State
Constitution that created it,” state courts may interpret state laws
governing presidential elections the same way they would any other
state statutes.502
Justice Stevens’s dissent flatly misreads McPherson. As Justice
Stevens contends, McPherson recognizes that a state constitution
generally may limit the authority that a state’s citizens confer on
their legislature.503 McPherson goes on to note that the U.S.
Constitution frequently imposes powers and duties on “the State as

Id. at 112.
Id.
497 Id. at 113.
498 Id. (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)).
499 Id. at 122.
500 Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
501 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25).
502 Id. at 124.
503 McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25.
495
496
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a political community.”504 When the U.S. Constitution forbids or
requires “a State” as an entity to do something, the state’s
legislative power must be exercised “under state constitutions as
they exist.”505 In such cases, the legislature is constrained by the
state constitution’s substantive restrictions. Stevens’s analysis of
McPherson ends there.
Crucially, however, McPherson emphasizes that the “insertion
of those words”—specifically referring to the Presidential Electors
Clause’s use of the term “legislature”—changes this analysis.506 The
clause’s grant of federal constitutional power specifically to the state
legislature “operat[es] as a limitation upon the State in respect of
any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power,” including
through the state constitution.507 McPherson explained that the
analysis would be different if the Presidential Electors Clause had
instead granted power to the “States,” rather than conferring
authority specifically on state legislatures.508 Had the Constitution
been drafted differently, state constitutions would have been able to
constrain legislatures’ power over the appointment of electors.
Thus, Justice Stevens’s Bush v. Gore dissent rips a single sentence
from McPherson out of context, overlooks the parts of the paragraph
in McPherson that explicitly reaffirm the independent state
legislature doctrine, and ignores the key distinction that McPherson
draws between the state as an entity and the legislature.
Justice Stevens’s dissent is all the more remarkable because he
had issued another dissenting opinion just six months prior in
California Democratic Party v. Jones, questioning whether a state’s
citizens could amend state laws concerning federal elections
through an initiative process.509 His Jones dissent pointed out that
the Elections Clause confers power to regulate congressional
elections specifically on the state legislature, rather than the state
as an entity.510 He added that, under the independent state
legislature doctrine, “California’s classification of voter-approved
Id.
Id.
506 Id.
507 Id.
508 Id.
509 530 U.S. 567, 590 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
510 Id. at 603.
504
505
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initiatives as an exercise of legislative power would not render such
initiatives the act of the California Legislature within the meaning
of the Elections Clause.”511 Thus, even Justice Stevens was willing
to attribute at least some significance to the U.S. Constitution’s
delegations of authority specifically to state legislatures.
Justice Breyer’s separate dissent in Bush v. Gore rejected the
independent state legislature doctrine in a conclusory fashion,
without providing any reasoning or analysis.512 Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent likewise summarily rejects the doctrine, emphasizing that
federal courts are bound by state courts’ interpretations of state
laws, including those governing federal elections.513 Justice Souter’s
dissent, in contrast, was somewhat more sympathetic to the
doctrine. Recognizing that the Presidential Electors Clause grants
authority specifically to the legislature, Justice Souter wrote, “The
issue is whether the judgment of the State Supreme Court has
displaced the state legislature’s provisions for election contests: is
the law as declared by the court different from the provisions made
by the legislature . . . ?”514
Justice Souter opined that state courts were entitled to broad
deference when construing state laws, including those enacted
under the Presidential Electors Clause.515 The Clause required the
U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether the Florida Supreme
Court’s interpretation of state law “was so unreasonable as to
transcend the accepted bounds of statutory interpretation, to the
point of being a nonjudicial act and producing new law untethered
to the legislative Act in question.”516 Thus, unlike the other
dissenting Justices, Justice Souter was willing to recognize that the
Presidential Electors Clause imposes at least some outer limit on a
Id. His dissent did not mention McPherson or any other U.S. Supreme Court cases
discussing the doctrine.
512 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 148 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[N]either the text of
Article II itself nor [McPherson] leads to the conclusion that Article II grants unlimited power
to the legislature, devoid of any state constitutional limitations, to select the manner of
appointing electors.”).
513 Id. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Article II can hardly be read to invite this Court
to disrupt a State’s republican regime.”).
514 Id. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting).
515 Cf. id. at 131 (“None of the state court’s interpretations is unreasonable to the point of
displacing the legislative enactment . . . . [T]he law as declared is consistent with Article II.”).
516 Id.
511
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state court’s power to interpret state laws governing federal
elections.
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board is perhaps the
most important ruling stemming from the 2000 election concerning
the independent state legislature doctrine. The Court in that case
unanimously remanded the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling to
clarify its reasoning—apparently, to confirm that the court was
applying only state statutes and not the state constitution.517 Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board’s seeming refusal to allow courts
to consider the state constitution when interpreting state laws
governing federal elections strongly suggests that state
constitutions may not limit legislatures’ authority regarding such
elections.
The dissenting opinions in Bush v. Gore a few days later detract
from the power of that unanimous opinion. Justice Stevens’s
rejection of the doctrine was based primarily on a misreading of
McPherson;518 moreover, he had embraced the doctrine six months
earlier in Jones.519 Furthermore, both the concurring opinion in
Bush and, to a much lesser extent, the Court’s per curiam opinion
in that case reaffirmed the doctrine. And Justice Souter’s dissent
was not entirely hostile to the doctrine either.
A few years later, the Court denied certiorari in another
Elections Clause case, Colorado General Assembly v. Salazar, over
a strong three-Justice dissent.520 In 2003, the Colorado legislature
had adopted a new congressional district map to replace a courtdrawn plan.521 The Colorado Supreme Court invalidated the new
map on the grounds that it violated the state constitution’s
prohibition on redistricting more than once per decade.522 The court
further held that the Elections Clause did not allow the state
legislature to evade that restriction from the state constitution.523

531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (per curiam).
See supra notes 501–508 and accompanying text.
519 See supra notes 509–511 and accompanying text.
520 541 U.S. 1093 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
521 See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1224 (Colo. 2003), cert. denied sub
nom. Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Salazar, 541 U.S. 1093 (2004).
522 Id. at 1237–40.
523 Id. at 1232.
517
518
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The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.524 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas—the authors of the
concurrence in Bush v. Gore which embraced the independent state
legislature doctrine525—dissented, arguing that the Court should
have heard the Elections Clause issue.526 The dissenters reasoned
that, by preventing the institutional legislature from replacing the
state court’s congressional map, the Colorado Supreme Court
impermissibly treated the state court as part of the “Legislature” for
purposes of the Elections Clause.527 They declared, “[T]here must be
some limit on the State’s ability to define lawmaking by excluding
the legislature itself in favor of the courts.”528

Salazar, 541 U.S. at 1093.
531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
526 Salazar, 541 U.S. at 1093 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
527 Id. at 1094–95.
528 Id. at 1095. That ruling did not end the matter, however. Following the Court’s denial
of certiorari, a group of Colorado voters filed a new federal lawsuit, contending that the
Elections Clause entitled them to vote in the districts adopted by the institutional legislature.
See Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (D. Colo. 2005) (three-judge court), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam). A three-judge
district court initially denied relief under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, holding that the
lawsuit was an impermissible attempt to contest the Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling in
Salazar. Id. at 1127, 1132; see D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)
(holding that a state court’s final judgment may be challenged only in the U.S. Supreme
Court, not in lower federal courts); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (noting
that, following a final state court adjudication, “[u]nder the legislation of Congress, no court
of the United States other than [the U.S. Supreme Court] could entertain a proceeding to
reverse or modify the judgment”). The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the three-judge district
court ruling and remanded for further proceedings, because the voter plaintiffs had not been
involved in the earlier Salazar litigation. See Dennis, 546 U.S. at 466.
On remand, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from
maintaining their Elections Clause claims because they were “in privity” with the plaintiffs
in Salazar. Lance v. Dennis, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1161 (D. Colo. 2006) (three-judge court),
vacated in part and remanded sub nom. Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007) (per curiam).
The Court again heard the case but, in a unanimous per curiam ruling, determined that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their Elections Clause claims under the generalized
grievance doctrine. Coffman, 549 U.S. at 441–42.
The other case in which the Court touched on the Elections Clause during this interregnum
did not implicate the independent state legislature doctrine. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S.
254, 280 (2003) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that the anti-commandeering doctrine does
not apply in the context of federal elections, because “the state legislature’s obligation to
prescribe the ‘Times, Places and Manner’ of holding congressional elections is grounded in
[the Elections Clause] of the Constitution itself and not any mere statutory requirement”).
524
525
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Most recently, in 2015, the Court’s 5–4 ruling in Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission
(AIRC) summarily rejected the doctrine, albeit arguably in dicta.529
The citizens of Arizona had passed an initiative that amended their
state constitution to strip the institutional legislature of authority
over congressional redistricting and reassign it to an independent
commission.530 The Legislature argued that this violated the
Elections Clause, which confers authority to regulate congressional
elections—including the power to draw districts—specifically on the
“Legislature.”531 The majority rejected the legislature’s claim and
upheld the constitutionality of the independent commission.532
The majority began by reiterating that a legislature must
exercise its power under the Elections Clause “in accordance with
the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking . . . .”533 Thus, there was no
procedural problem with the fact that the state’s independent
commission had been created through an initiative rather than by
the institutional legislature.534 Prior cases supported the principle
that an institutional legislature’s enactments concerning federal
elections are subject to the legislative process set forth in the state
constitution, potentially including a veto either by the Governor535
or through a public referendum process.536 AIRC transmutes that
principle into the dubious notion that a state constitution may
redefine the term “Legislature” to allow federal elections to be
regulated through a distinct lawmaking process, such as a public
initiative, that completely excludes the institutional legislature.537
The Court did not acknowledge that its conclusion was a dramatic
expansion of Davis in particular, which had avoided the Elections
Clause issue and, at most, allowed a public referendum to be

576 U.S. 787, 824 (2015).
Id. at 792.
531 Id.
532 Id. at 824.
533 Id. at 808.
534 Id. 808–09 (“[W]e see no constitutional barrier to a State’s empowerment of its people
by embracing that form of lawmaking.”).
535 See supra notes 459–462 and accompanying text.
536 See supra notes 414–428 and accompanying text.
537 AIRC, 576 U.S. at 808–09.
529
530
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included as a step in the institutional legislature’s own lawmaking
process.538
Moving past the manner in which the commission was created,
the Court further held that there was no substantive problem with
prohibiting the institutional legislature from drawing congressional
district lines and transferring such authority to a different entity.539
It held that the purpose of the Elections Clause “was to empower
Congress to override state election rules, not to restrict the way
States enact legislation.”540 The Court later summarily declared
that the Elections Clause does not permit a state legislature to
“prescribe regulations on the time, place, and manner of holding
federal elections in defiance of provisions of the State’s
constitution.”541 The Court ignored its statements to the contrary in
McPherson and Leser. It noted that the House of Representatives
had reached the opposite conclusion in resolving the election contest
in Baldwin v. Trowbridge,542 but dismissed that precedent as
politically motivated.543 It did not consider any other congressional
or state supreme court precedents applying the independent state
legislature doctrine. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a four-Justice
dissent, contending that the majority’s ruling “erase[s] the words ‘by
the Legislature thereof’ from the Elections Clause.”544
Thus, the Court has gone from enthusiastically embracing the
independent state legislature doctrine to rejecting it in a hotly
contested 5–4 ruling. The AIRC majority treated the doctrine as
anomalous dicta from a century-old U.S. Supreme Court ruling,
bolstered only by a single, politically motivated House precedent. To
the contrary, the doctrine not only is solidly grounded in the
Constitution’s plain text, but also reflects the predominant
See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916).
AIRC, 576 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he Elections Clause permits the people of Arizona to provide
for redistricting by independent commission.”); id. at 814 (“[T]he people may delegate their
legislative authority over redistricting to an independent commission . . . .”).
540 Id. at 814–15.
541 Id. at 817–18.
542 H.R. REP. NO. 39-13 (1866), resolution proposed by committee report adopted, CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 845 (1866).
543 AIRC, 576 U.S. at 818 (“[I]t was perhaps not entirely accidental that the candidate the
Committee declared winner in Baldwin belonged to the same political party as all but one
member of the House Committee majority responsible for the decision.”).
544 Id. at 842 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).
538
539
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interpretation of the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors
Clause in the state courts as well as both chambers of Congress
throughout the nineteenth century.
C. IMPLEMENTING THE DOCTRINE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY

A U.S. Supreme Court committed to textualism, historical
practice, or structuralism has at least three different options for
integrating the independent state legislature doctrine into modern
law. The most extreme approach would be to construe the term
“Legislature” in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors
Clause literally, thereby implementing the independent state
legislature doctrine to the fullest possible extent. Under such an
approach, only a state’s institutional legislature may regulate
federal elections—no other entities or processes (e.g., public
initiatives or referenda) may be involved—and the state
constitution may not impose substantive restrictions on the scope of
the legislature’s authority. That is how the Court approached the
Article V Amendments Clause in Hawke and Leser.545 This extreme
approach would require overturning Davis (the referendum case),
Smiley (the gubernatorial veto case), and AIRC (the independent
redistricting commission case). It would also invalidate the
independent redistricting commissions that states have created to
draw congressional district lines,546 as well as the substantive
prohibitions that a few other state constitutions impose against
political gerrymanders in congressional redistricting.547
Professor Persily identifies numerous state laws regulating
federal elections that were enacted via public referendum or
initiative that he cautions could also be challenged if the Court
adopted this extreme approach to the independent state legislature
doctrine.548 Such potential consequences are less concerning,
however, because state legislatures remain free to immediately
reenact such provisions. Additionally, should the Court adopt this
version of the doctrine, it could apply its holding prospectively,
See supra Section V.A.
See supra note 13.
547 See supra note 11.
548 See Persily et al., supra note 32, at 715–18.
545
546
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refusing to invalidate existing laws solely on the grounds they were
enacted through an incorrect procedure.
Professor Persily also notes that many state constitutions
contain various rules governing the electoral process, including
requirements that elections be conducted by ballot, voters be
registered, candidates receive a plurality of votes to win, and
absentee voting be permitted.549 Invalidating these generally
uncontroversial provisions would be largely inconsequential,
however, since most states invariably have separate statutes
implementing identical rules, and legislatures would be free to
enact them as necessary. Moreover, many state constitutions’
election-related provisions simply reiterate protections already
established under the U.S. Constitution that would remain in force.
Thus, Professor Persily’s prudential argument against the
independent state legislature doctrine is drastically overstated. The
primary immediate consequence of implementing this doctrine
would be to invalidate independent congressional redistricting
commissions and state constitutional limits on political
gerrymandering in congressional elections. Even then, both state
legislatures and Congress remain free to enact laws prohibiting
political gerrymanders or requiring that independent commissions
draw district lines.
Other methods of implementing the independent state
legislature doctrine would require fewer adjustments. The least
radical alternative would be for the Court to conclude that the
doctrine allows the state constitution to define what processes and
entities constitute the state “Legislature” for purposes of the
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, while
preventing the state constitution from imposing substantive
restrictions on that legislature’s authority to regulate federal
elections. This interpretation would be consistent with the holdings
of Davis, Smiley, Leser, and AIRC; leave Hawke limited to the
context of the Article V Amendments Clause; and require rejection
only of some language in AIRC that likely amounts to dicta.550
Id. at 720–22.
See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 817–18
(2015) (“Nothing in [the Elections Clause] instructs, nor has this Court ever held, that a state
legislature may prescribe regulations on the time, place, and manner of holding federal
elections in defiance of provisions of the State’s constitution.”).
549
550
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Under this approach, the institutional legislature could be
completely excluded from regulating federal elections, but some
entity within the state would retain plenary power over the field,
free of any substantive restrictions in the state constitution.
Perhaps the best compromise approach—which is consistent
with nineteenth century precedent—would be for the Court to
conclude: (i) the term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause and
Presidential Electors Clause refers only to the institutional state
legislature, (ii) state constitutions and statutes cannot impose
substantive limits on the scope of the institutional legislature’s
authority over federal elections, and (iii) when the institutional
legislature exercises that authority by passing laws that apply to
presidential or congressional elections, it remains subject to
whatever procedures the state constitution contains for the
enactment of legislation. This approach is consistent with Davis,
Smiley, and Leser, and would leave Hawke’s holding limited to the
Article V Amendments Clause. The only ruling that would require
reversal is the Court’s recent 5–4 decision in AIRC, which was
partially premised on an erroneous understanding of the
independent state legislature doctrine’s history.551
Under this approach, state constitutions or statutes may
establish independent redistricting commissions to promulgate
congressional district maps. Those maps would be binding unless
the legislature exercised its inalienable authority granted by the
U.S. Constitution to adopt its own congressional districts, instead.
Congress, of course, could go even further by requiring independent
commissions to draw all congressional district maps, completely
excluding the institutional legislature.
This compromise interpretation has much to recommend it.
First, it respects precedent, requiring reversal of only one recent,
incorrectly reasoned 5–4 case that has not yet generated substantial

551 See supra Section V.B. The Court could even adopt Baldwin v. Trowbridge’s concession
that a state constitutional convention might qualify as a legislature. See supra note 266 and
accompanying text. Under Baldwin, state constitutional provisions may presumptively
govern federal elections unless and until the institutional state legislature decides to displace
or act contrary to them. See id.
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reliance.552 Second, it coheres with the normative justifications for
the independent state legislature doctrine,553 the text and structure
of the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, and the
prevailing understanding of those provisions throughout the
nineteenth century. Finally, this compromise interpretation does
not completely eliminate the possibility of using independent
redistricting commissions to combat political gerrymandering. In
short, this modern variation of the independent state legislature
doctrine provides the best overall “fit” with the fabric of
constitutional law.

VI. CONCLUSION
The independent state legislature doctrine provides that a state
constitution may not impose substantive restrictions on an
institutional state legislature’s authority to regulate federal
elections. State constitutional provisions that specifically regulate
redistricting, including prohibitions on partisan gerrymandering,
are unenforceable in the context of congressional elections, though
they are enforceable with regard to state legislative elections. Even
under the doctrine, however, both the U.S. Constitution and federal
law limit a state legislature’s authority over federal elections. The
independent state legislature doctrine is faithful to both the text
and structure of the U.S. Constitution, furthers many of the
Framers’ goals concerning federal elections, and reflects the
prevailing understanding of states, Congress, and other authorities
throughout the nineteenth century.

552 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2098 (2018) (“Reliance interests are
a legitimate consideration when the Court weighs adherence to an earlier but flawed
precedent.”).
553 See supra Section II.D.
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